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The President is vitally interested in developing national energy self­
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of outer continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas re­
sources has raised recurring problems in federal-state relations.2 The 
I. OCS Oversight-Part 2: Hearings 011 OCS Oversight and Related Issues, the 
National OCS Program and the Five- Year OCS Leasing Program Before the Subcomm. on 
the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelfof the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1981) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2] 
(statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
2. See Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral 
Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1976); Galloway & Nixon, The Newest Federalism and 
Coastal Areas, 25 OCEANUS 3 (1982). For discussions on federalism and natural resource 
development, see generally Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71 (1980); Ball, Good Old American 
Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVTL. 
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problems raised concern matters such as how, when, and in what man-
L. 623 (1982); Berg, Management ofPacific Ocean Salmon Ranching: A Problem ofFeder­
alism in the Coastal Zone, 9 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 41 (1981); Berg, Private Ocean 
Ranching of Pacific Salmon and Fishery Management: A Problem of Federalism, 12 
ENVTL. L. 81 (1981); FIorini, Issues ofFederalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Coopera
tion or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1982); Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalism 
in the Fishery Conservation Zone: A New Role for the States in An Era ofFederal Regula­
tory Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 641 (1982); Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regula
•tion 	of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1980); MacRae, The Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act: The States' Role in Domestic and International Fishery 
Management, 88 DICK. L. REV. 306 (1984); Mills & Woodson, Energy Policy: A Test for 
Federalism, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 405 (1976); Moull, Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in 
Canadian Federalism, 18 OSGOODE HALL L.J. I (1980); Rogalski, The Unique Federalism 
of the Regional Councils Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 9 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163 (1980); Schoenbaum & Parker, Federalism in the Coastal 
Zone: Three Models ofState Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.CL. REv. 231 (1979); Skillern, 
Constitutional and Statutory Issues ofFederalism in the Development ofEnergy Resources, 
17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533 (1985); Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under the Sur­
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run A Government?, 87 W. 
VA. L. REV. 687 (1985); Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for 
State Control ofNatural Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601 (1982). 
Since the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the federal government, as part of a national 
policy to achieve energy self-sufficiency, has supported programs to increase the production 
of domestic energy resources, particularly the large quantities of fossil fuels located in the 
western United States. Hall, White & Ballard, Western States and National Energy Policy, 
22 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 191 (1978) [hereinafter Hall]. For example, President 
Carter proposed the creation of an Energy Mobilization Board (EMB) in his July 15, 1979 
energy address to the nation. The EMB would be empowered to expedite decision making 
of federal, state, and local agencies of priority energy projects. Comment, The Energy Mo­
bilization Board, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 727, 727(1980) [hereinafter The Energy Mobilization 
Board]. The expediting process, often referred to as "fast tracking," raised significant con­
stitutional problems. The difficulty with "fast tracking" was the attempt to dictate to the 
states and local governments the means by which those entities should discharge their dele­
gated functions. Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field ofEnergy Resource Devel
opment: Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 863-64 (1980). "Fast 
tracking" would have resulted in the imposition of federal controls over basic state and 
local government decisionmaking concerning the selection, approval, and licensing of des­
ignated priority energy projects. State and local government decisionmaking powers and 
approval processes would be subject to preemption by the EMB. Fischer, supra, at 848. 
Western states were also concerned that such legislation would transfer the control of water 
availability from them to the EMB and eventually result in federal control of a traditional 
local resource. Fischer, supra, at 831. Congress rejected President Carter's EMB proposal 
because of concerns that the EMB would encroach upon states' rights. The Energy Mobili­
zation Board, supra, at 747. 
These policies have affected federal-state relations, and some western states have ar­
gued for a larger role in national decisionmaking in energy, environmental, and natural 
resource areas. Hall, supra, at 191-92. For discussions on federal-state relationships and 
resource development, see generally Engdahl, Some Observations on State and Federal Con
trol of Natural Resources, 15 Hous. L. REV ..1201 (1978); Engdahl, State and Federal 
Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976); Grainey, Energy Conservation: 
The Federal-State Nexus, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 611 (1978); Harvey, Federal-State Relation­
ships in Federal Land and Resource Management, 54 DEN. L.J. 585 (1977); Huffman, Gov
erning America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863 (1982); Leman & 
4 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
ner OCS petroleum resources should be developed to satisfy national 
energy requirements. 3 National plans.to increase oil a'nd gas produc­
tion on the OCS have provoked conflict between coastal states and the 
federal government for the last decade.4 
Coastal states are concerned over both the development of OCS 
energy resources within their coastal areas, 5 and the federal govern­
ment's failure to develop a comprehensive national energy plan.6 A 
consequence of that failure is that one resource may be favored for· 
expedited development over other resources. 7 Furthermore, the OCS 
leasing program will be largely determined by national policies set by 
Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 
ENVTL. L. 981 (1982); Lyons, Federalism and Resource Development: A New Role for 
States?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931 (1982); Shapiro, Energy Development on the Public Domain: 
Federal/State Cooperation and Conflict Regarding Environmental Land Use Control, 9 
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 397 (1976); Thomas, The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Case 
Study of Federal Administrative Control Over Traditionally Local Land Use Decisions, 12 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225 (1985); White &.Barry, Energy Development in the West: 
Conflict and Coordination of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1976); 
Comment, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 817 (1980); Note, Federal-State Conflict in Energy Development: An Illustration, 53 
DEN. L.J. 521 (1976); Comment, Federal and State Cooperation in the Management of 
Public Lands, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 149 (1978); Comment, State and Local Control ofEnergy 
Development on Federal Lands, 32 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1980). 
3. Breeden, supra note 2, at 1I08; Skillern, supra note 2, at 534. 
4. OCS Five-Year Development Plan: Hearing on the Department of the Interior's 
Recommendations for this Nation's Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program 
for the Next Five Years Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelfof 
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1987) 
[hereinafter Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan] (statement of Representative W.J. (Billy) 
Tauzin of Louisiana); Five Year OCS Leasing Schedule: Hearing on the Status of the Cur­
rent Five- Year Outer Continental ShelfLeasing Schedule, the Pace of the Leasing Schedule, 
and Other OCS-Related Issues Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental 
Shelfofthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98tli Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) 
[hereinafter Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule]; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. 
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSU­
LAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., A REPORT ON THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
JAMES G. WATT'S FIVE YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PLAN FOR THE OUTER CONTINEN­
TAL SHELF I (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE­
YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN]. 
5. See generally Hunt, Introduction: Offshore Oil and Gas-Past, Present, Future, 26 
OCEANUS 3 (1983); Note, "Not on My Beach':' Local California Initiatives to Prevent On­
shore Support Facilities for Offshore Oil Development, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1987). 
6. National Energy Policies Should Improve While Oil Market Depressed, Oil & Gas 
J., Mar. 31, 1986, at 41; Energy Policy in the u.s. Still Failing Due to Faulty Premises, Oil & 
Gas J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 41; Industry Should Seek Sound u.s. Energy Policy, Not Oil 
Import Levy, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 55; u.s. Nonenergy Policies Undermine Energy 
Policy's Market Emphasis, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 39; Energy Plan Needed Now, 
Offshore, May 1985, at 97; DOE, Interior Merger Could Strengthen u.s. Energy Policy, Oil 
& Gas J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 55. 
7. Skillern, supra note 2, at 534-35. 
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the federal government, but the development of OCS oil and gas 
reserves will have a severe impact on the states.8 Coastal states must 
respond to the "boomtown" effects from OCS energy development. 9 
The states must assume the costs of providing a proper infrastruc­
ture-new housing, schools, roads, and expanded municipal serv­
ices-in those areas impacted by offshore oil development. \0 
To accelerate the development of the nation's OCS energy 
resources, the Reagan administration approved two OCS leasing pro­
grams ll that go far beyond the leasing schedules of every administra­
tion from President Eisenhower, when OCS leasing began, to 
President Carter.12 The first leasing program, developed by Secretary 
Watt, covered the five-year period from August 1982 to June 1987.13 
The second program, prepared by Secretary Hodel, extends from mid­
1987 to mid-1992.14 
Development of OCS resources, however, presents numerous en­
vironmental, economic, and political concerns. 15 "No other region in 
our country is subject to so many urgent demands from powerful con­
8. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1450, 1496 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 590]. See also Hall, supra 
note 2, at 191. 
9. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1496. See also Skillern, supra note 2, at 535. 
10. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1462. See also Skillern, supra note 2, at 535. 
11. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments require the Secretary of 
the Interior to prepare a five-year plan for oil and gas leasing indicating the size, timing, 
and location of leasing activity which the Secretary determines will best meet national en­
ergy needs. 43 U.S.c. § 1344 (1982). 
12. Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's Five­
Year Leasing Plan-Part J: Hearings on Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the De­
partment of the Interior's Five-Year Leasing Plan Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining ofthe House Comm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Lease 
Sales-Part J]. 
13. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1 FINAL SUP­
PLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR 
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY 1982-DECEMBER 1986 (1981) 
[hereinafter 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE]; HOUSE 
REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 1. 
14. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED FI­
NAL FIVE-YEAR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM MID­
1987 TO MID-1992 (1987) [hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PRO­
GRAM 1987-1992]; Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release: Inte­
rior Department Releases Proposed Five- Year Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program (Apr. 
27,1987) [hereinafter u.s. Dep't of the Interior News Release, Apr. 27,1987]' 
15. Hunt, supra note 5, at 8. 
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fticting interests as the coastal area."16 More than 50% of the popula­
tion of the United States currently lives within fifty miles of the 
country's coasts or the shores of the Great Lakes, and it is estimated 
that by the year 2000, 80% of our population may live in this areaP 
The space available for that increased population will not change sig­
nificantly in the next twenty years. The coastal zone will experience 
competitive demands for that limited space from commercial, residen­
tial, recreational, and other development interests which must be bal­
anced against the impact on the scenic beauty and delicate ecological 
systems of the coastal zone. IS 
Coastal states are willing to contribute to national energy self­
sufficiency and are not unalterably opposed to OCS leasing off their 
shores. 19 However, they are concerned about the potential impacts an 
accelerated program would have on their coastal areas, and they fear 
that their interests may be overlooked by federal officials during the 
development of short-term energy policy.20 The implementation of an 
accelerated OCS oil and gas program has been a subject of controversy 
since 1974 when President Nixon directed the Secretary of the Interior 
to triple, from three million to ten million acres a year, OCS acreage 
16. Kuersteiner, Sullivan & Temin, Protecting Our Coastal Interests: A Policy for 
Coordinating Coastal Zone Management. National Defense and the Federal Supremacy 
Doctrine, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 705 (1980). 
17. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4776, 4777 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 753]. 
18. See S. REP. No. 753, supra note 17, at 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4777. The significance of the coastal zone and the competition among users 
within the area is described in a government report: 
The coast of the United States is, in many respects, the Nation's most valua­
ble geographic feature. It is at the juncture of the land and sea that the great part 
of this Nation's trade and industry takes place. The waters off the shore are 
among the most biologically productive regions of the Nation. 
The uses of valuable coastal areas generate issues of intense State and local 
interest, but the effectiveness with which the resources of the coastal zone are 
used and protected often is a matter of national importance. Navigation and mili­
tary uses of the coasts and waters offshore clearly are direct Federal responsibili­
ties: economic development, recreation, and conservation interests are shared by 
the Federal Government and the States. 
Rapidly intensifying use of coastal areas already has outrun the capabilities 
of local governments to plan their orderly development and to resolve conflicts. 
The division of responsibilities among the several levels of government is unclear, 
and the knowledge and procedures for formulating sound decisions are lacking. 
S. REP. No. 753, supra note 17, at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
4778. 
19. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR DCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 42. 
20. Id. 
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under lease.21 
Many of these controversies have continued with the implementa­
tion of Reagan administration policies and were particularly height­
ened under the tenure of Secretary Watt. 22 The offshore oil and gas 
leasing program initiated by the Reagan administration was the most 
ambitious and controversial energy development program in the na­
tion's history. Issues such as the pace and timing of lease sales,con­
sultation and coordination with state and local governments and 
interested parties, prelease consistency,23 areawide leasing, fair market 
value, and leasing moratoria have become major obstacles to the full 
implementation of an accelerated OCS oil and gas program. These 
issues predominantly emerged following the inauguration of President 
Reagan in 198124 and are the focus of this study. 
Accordingly, Part I examines the policy rationale for Secretary 
Watt's accelerated leasing program.25 Part II examines the issues 
raised by opponents to the Secretary's approach including the coastal 
states' ability to cope with the onshore effects of increased offshore 
leasing,26 questions about the DOl's ability to manage an increased 
leasing schedule27 and about the petroleum industry's ability to in­
crease OCS exploration,28 and concerns about the Reagan administra­
tion's commitment to protecting the coastal environment.29 Part II 
also examines additional environmental concerns raised by areawide 
leasing30 and discusses whether areawide leasing precludes receipt of 
fair market value for the public resources being sold.31 Part III exam­
ines the phenomenon of piecemeal leasing moratoria,32 the congres­
sional response to Secretary Watt's accelerated leasing schedule. 
Finally, Part IV examines Secretary Watt's implementation of the 
areawide leasing concept. 33 
21. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1506-07. 
22. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 1, 36, 42-49. 
23. Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 46 (statement of 
Representative Young of Alaska). 
24. Id. 
25. See infra notes 34-101 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 110-46 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 182-219 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 220-97 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 298-368 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 369-422 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE W A Tr FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PROGRAM OF 1982-87 

AND ASSOCIATED POLICIES 

To accelerate the development of the nation's offshore energy po­
tential, Secretary of the Interior James Watt, on July 21, 1982, ap­
proved a leasing schedule that offered almost the entire OCS for 
exploration and development. 34 This schedule replaced the June, 1980 
final leasing schedule approved during the Carter administration by 
Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus. 35 The Watt program offered for lease 
nearly one billion acres of federal OCS lands during the five year pe­
riod from August 1982 to June 1?87, compared to fifty-five million 
acres under the Andrus proposal. 36 This amounted to twenty times as 
34. Minerals Management Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release I (July 21, 
1982) [hereinafter News Release (July 21, 1982)]; Final Five-Year Plan for Oil and Gas 
Development in the Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings to Review the Secretary of the Inte­
rior's Proposed Five- Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf 
Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Sub­
comm. on Energy Conservation and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1982) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on the Five- Year OCS 
Leasing Plan] (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut). 
The offshore leasing plan became final in July, 1982, after 19 months of consultation 
between the Department of the Interior and 23 affected states. The administrative record 
contains over 5000 pages and reflects participation by local governments, environmental 
groups, industry, and the public. The effort was described by Secretary Watt as "the most 
comprehensive, exhaustive project in the [Interior] Department's history." Senate Hear­
ings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra, at 9 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary 
of the Interior); News Release (July 21, 1982), supra. 
With Congress unwilling to seriously consider legislation to abolish the Energy De­
partment or hasten decontrol of natural gas prices, Secretary Watt's controversial program 
to rapidly accelerate the pace of federal OCS leasing was especially important. Watt's pro­
gram was the only active energy policy proposal during the first term of the Reagan admin­
istration. A Quiet Point Man for Oil Leasing, Bus. WK. 75 (Aug. 30, 1982). 
35. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 5-6; Vass, A Comparison ofAmerican and British Offshore Oil Development Dur­
ing the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations. Part 1,21 TULSA L.J. 23, 59-60 (1985)' [here­
inafter Vass 1]. 
Changes in the leasing schedule are authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 630 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.c., 42 U.S.c., 43 U.S. C.). The Secretary of the Interior 
is charged with reviewing and periodically revising the OCS leasing program. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a) (1982). 
36. 'News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1,4. See Senate Hearings on the 
Five- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 14 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of 
the Interior). The exact size of the United States outer continental shelf has not been estab­
lished. Area estimates provided by the Department of the Interior range from about 800 
million to over one billion acres. OCS Oversight-Part 1: Hearings on Provisions of the 
OCSLA Concerning Interrelationships of Federal and State Governments in the Decision­
making Process and the Importance of the oes on the Coastal Zone Before the Subcomm. 
on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 
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much acreage as was offered under the Andrus plan, and twenty-five 
times as much as was offered during the entire period from 1954, when 
the program began, to 1980.37 
The Watt program scheduled forty-one lease sales over the five 
year period from 1982 to 1987. One billion acres, divided into eight­
een planning areas ranging in size from 8 million to 133 million acres, 
were considered for leasing. In coritrast, prior lease sales covered 
about two million acres. 38 One-half of the acreage offered was In 
Alaska's OCS.39 
Secretary Watt maintained that accelerating offshore leasing in 
frontier OCS areas, such as Alaska, was in the national interest.40 He 
claimed that the program "will enhance ... national security, provide 
1]. For the purpose of this study, a reasonable estimate of the federal OCS areas out to a 
depth of 2500 meters is about one billion acres (965.8 million acres). COMPTROLLER GEN­
ERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. EMD 81-59, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 3-4 
(1981) [hereinafter ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS]. "This area is equal in size to 
roughly half the U.S. land mass." HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS 
LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 6 n.19. Submerged lands under state jurisdiction are esti­
mated to total an additional 32.7 million acres. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, 
supra, at 3. 
37. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 1 (state­
ment of Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S 
FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 6. 
38. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 4. Twelve sales were scheduled in 
the Gulf of Mexico, 16 in offshore Alaska, four in California, and eight in the Atlantic. 
One reoffering sale was scheduled to reoffer all of the unleased tracts. News Release (July 
21, 1982), supra note 34, at 4. The final leasing program approved by Secretary Andrus in 
June 1980, scheduled 36 sales over the five-year period 1980 through 1985. Eleven sales 
were scheduled off the Gulf of Mexico, six in the Atlantic, four off California, and 10 in 
offshore Alaska. Five reoffering sales were also scheduled. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY 
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 5. 
39. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 21 (state­
ment of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
40. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (Apr. 16, 1981) 
[hereinafter News Release (Apr. 16, 1981)]. Secretary Watt explained the need to expedite 
leasing in high potential offshore areas in the following manner: 
Much of America's untapped petroleum resource may lie offshore in frontier 
areas which have never been explored. To help reduce our dependence on costly 
and uncertain foreign oil, we must inventory the lands subject to Federal control 
in order to determine the value of the resources which may be hidden within 
them. To do so we must facilitate exploration and development in those areas 
with potential resource value. The proposal which is being announced today is 
designed to achieve these goals while preserving sound environmental safeguards. 
The program we are proposing will make more acreage available for leasing, 
will cut substantially the time now required to start leasing in promising frontier 
areas, and will use the market mechanism rather than arbitrary government deci­
sions in selecting areas for lease and exploration. 
By improving leasing procedures and eliminating administrative bottlenecks, 
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jobs, and protect the environment while making America less depen­
dent on foreign oil sources."41 According to Secretary Watt, his OCS 
lease schedule would improve the efficiency of the OCS leasing pro­
gram and increase the availability to the United States of critical off­
shore energy resources. The Secretary outlined the major objectives of 
the revised OCS program as including: (1) a substantial increase in 
the rate of OCS leasing; (2) early lease sales of frontier areas with high 
oil and gas potential; (3) streamlining the OCS program to shorten the 
presale planning process including telescoping, areawide environmen­
tal analysis, and tiering of National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) assessments.42 The main thrust of the program was to accel­
erate the rate of OCS lease sales.43 
we can speed leasing while at the same time maintaining careful protection of 
environmental values. 
Id. 
41. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1. James Edwards, Energy Secre­
tary, hailed the decision to accelerate the pace of offshore oil and gas leasing on the OCS: 
America is and for many years in the future will continue to be heavily de­
pendent upon petroleum. Conservation can help, and is helping, but conservation 
is not the total answer. What we desperately need-and what has been lacking in 
recent times-is a determination and commitment to find and put into production 
the petroleum resources that America has. 
The President believes that we can restore our capabilities to produce enough 
energy domestically so that we are not vulnerable to unreasonable price increases 
or political blackmail by major oil producing countries or their cartels. We live in 
an interdependent world, but that does not mean that we can afford to become 
dangerously dependent upon other nations-sometimes unfriendly nations-for 
the essential elements of our economy. 
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1 (Apr. 10, 1981) [hereinafter News Release (Apr. 
10, 1981)] (quoting James Edwards, Energy Secretary). 
42. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). In a statement by Secretary Watt before the House Sub­
committee, he explained that the revised OCS program would consist of the following: 
First, there will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of high poten­
tial. Here we are talking about the frontier areas of offshore Alaska. We are 
proposing earlier offerings of four of the five high-potential basins involved. 
Second, we propose early reentry into high-potential areas. Spacing between 
first and second offerings is being decreased from 3 years to 2 years. 
Third, we are streamlining the OCS leasing program. This includes propos­
als for a general reduction in the time needed to hold a lease sale, area-wide envi­
ronmental and hydrocarbon resource assessments, tiering of NEPA documents, 
larger lease offerings. and more efficient methods for assuring receipt of fair mar­
ket value. 
The key is streamlining the program, including earlier opening of areas with 
high potential. 
Id. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & 
Supp. V 1987). 
43. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1 (July IS, 1981) 
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A. Accelerated oes Leasing 
Although the Reagan administration's decision to speed up off­
shore leasing was not the first time the OCS program has been acceler­
ated as part of a national energy program,44 the OCS leasing program 
approved by Secretary Watt was a dramatic departure from past lease 
schedules.45 While the number of OCS lease sales did not significantly 
increase, rising from thirty-six to forty-one during the five year period, 
the number of acres offered for leasing rose dramatically. For exam­
ple, the average sale made by Secretary Andrus was 900,000 acres; 
under Secretary Watt's plan the average sale was about twenty-four 
million acres.46 Under the Watt accelerated leasing schedule, the Inte­
rior Department reviewed almost the entire federal OCS- about one 
billion acres-for oil and gas leasing during 1982-87.47 In contrast, 
from 1954 through 1980, only forty-one million acres of federal off­
shore lands were offered for lease and less than half, about nineteen 
million acres, were actually leased.48 The most OCS acreage ever 
leased in one year was 1.8 million acres in 1979.49 
[hereinafter News Release (July 15, 1981)], This news release is reprinted in Hearings on 
oes Lease Sales-Part 1, supra note 12, at 572-76. 
44. In response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, President Nixon announced 
"Project Independence," a plan by which the United States would seek to become energy 
self-sufficient by 1980. In April 1973, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
triple, from one million to three million acres a year, oes acreage under lease. In January 
1974, President Nixon instructed the Interior Department to further accelerate the pace of 
OCS leasing from three million to 10 million acres, another tripling of the OCS leasing goal 
in less than one year. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1506-07; Comment, Onshore Impacts o/Offshore Drilling: 
The Police Power Alternative, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 967 (1976). Some commentators, however, 
argue that energy independence is an unattainable national goal. See Debating Self-Suffi­
ciency, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 49. For an informative discussion of United States 
energy policy since World War II, see Goodwin, Energy: 1945-1980, 5 WILSON Q. 55 
(1981). 
45. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1. 
46. SIERRA CLUB, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY: PUBLIC OIL, GAS, AND COAL AND 
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 6 (1982). 
47. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATf'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 6. "One or more times during the five-year period, all the tracts in each of the 18 
Outer Continental Shelf planning areas ... [were] offered for lease, excepting tracts elimi­
nated for environmental reasons and to accommodate other uses." News Release (July 15, 
1981), supra note 43, at 1. While the Interior Department offered almost one billion OCS 
acres for oil and gas leasing, Secretary Watt actually hoped to annually lease between five 
and twelve million acres. 
48. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 22. 
49. OFFSHORE INFORMATION & PUBLICATIONS, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., 
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OCS REPORT MMS 89-0058, FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATIS­
TICS: 1987, LEASING, EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION & REVENUES 12 (1989) [hereinafter 
1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS]. 
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Not only did the acreage for each sale increase under the Watt 
plan, but the total annual acreage offered also increased. Past annual 
offerings ranged from 1.8 million acres in 1977 to 7.7 million acres in 
1981. However, 1983 total offerings were approximately 120 million 
acres and a record 154 million acres were offered in 1984.50 
The average annual OCS acreage offered and leased had been 
modest. From 1971 through 1980, about 2.9 million acres of OCS 
lands were offered for lease and approximately 1.2 million acres were 
leased.5 I Table 1 shows the total number of OCS acres offered and 
leased from 1954 through 1987. 
Despite the optimistic appraisal of the energy resource potential 
of OCS lands, in 1980, only one percent of all.outer continental shelf 
acreage was under lease, only 2 % had ever been leased, and less than 
4% had ever been offered for lease. 52 The Reagan administration 
maintained that the only way to determine accurately the amount of 
recoverable oil and gas in the OCS was to accelerate exploratory drill­
ing in the nation's offshore regions. 53 Thus, accelerated leasing would 
aid in inventorying the wealth of the United States OCS as rapidly as 
possible.54 
50. Id. at 12. 
51. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 30. 
52. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of W. Kenneth 
Davis, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy). Of nearly one billion acres of federal OCS 
lands, only 45 million were under lease as of December 31, 1987. 1987 FEDERAL OFF­
SHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12. 
53. Offshore Leasing: Department ofthe Interior Oversight: Hearings Before the Sub­
comm. on Environment. Energy. and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Govern­
ment Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 513-14 (1981) [hereinafter Offshore Leasing 
Hearings] (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt stated: 
The peoples of a land cannot understand their resource wealth until the re­
sources have been inventoried and their value and extent is known. With all of 
America's greatness, we still do not understand our own wealth. We must inven­
tory our lands. 
Today we do not know the full extent of our mineral values, our agricultural 
potential, or our oil and gas reserves. Unfortunately, the only way at this time to 
inventory our lands to determine the qualities of oil and gas is to drill. Once we 
have inventoried the lands, we can then make wise decisions with regard to the 
aIlocation of wealth that is resident in the land. 
Id. 
The petroleum industry supports the Reagan administration's efforts to inventory 
United States offshore hydrocarbon resources. Accelerated OCS Leasing A Key to Vital 
Assessment of u.s. Resources, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 45 [hereinafter Accelerated 
OCS Leasing A Key to Vital Assessment of u.s. Resources]. Congress has declared that 
"there is a serious lack of adequate basic energy information ... with respect to the availa­
bility of oil and natural gas from the Outer Continental Shelf." 43 U.S.C. § 1865(a)(I) 
(1982). 
54. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of James G. 
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TABLE 1 








Offered Leased for Leases 
Year (million acres)· (million acres)· (million dollars)· 
1954 1.4 0.5 141.0 
1955 0.7 0.4 108.5 
1959 0.5 0.2 89.7 
1960 1.6 0.7 282.7 
1962 3.7 1.9 489.4 
1963 0.7 0.3 12.8 
1964 1.1 0.6 95.9 
1965 0.9 0.1 33.7 
1966 0.3 0.1 209.2 
1967 1.0 0.7 510.1 
1968 1.3 0.9 1,346.4 
1969 0.3 0.1 111.7 
1970 0.7 0.6 945.1 
1971 0.1 0.0 96.3 
1972 1.0 0.8 2,251.3 
1973 1.5 1.0 3,082.5 
1974 5.0 1.8 5,022.9 
1975 7.2 1.7 1,088.1 
1976 2.8 1.3 2,243.0 
1977 1.8 1.8 1,568.6 
1978 3.1 1.3 1,767.0 
1979 3.4 1.8 5,078.9 
1980 2.6 1.1 4,204.6 
1981 7.7 2.3 6,653.0 
1982 7.6 1.9 3,987.4 
1983 119.8 6.6 5,749.0 
1984 154.4 7.5 4,037.1 
1985 87.0 3.5 1,539.4 
1986 58.7 0.7 187.1 
1987 59.8 3.4 497.2 
TOTAL 538.0 45.0 53,429.8 
• rounded figures 
Source: Offshore Information & Publications, Minerals Management Serv., U.S. Dep't of 
the Interior, Federal Offshore Statistics: 1987, Leasing, Exploration, Production & Revenues 
12 (OCS Report MMS 89-0058, compiled by W. Harris and L. Thurston) (1989). 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt testified before Congress that the "funda­
mental purpose of the OCS program is to inventory and ultimately develop the hydrocar­
bon resources of the Outer Continental Shelf." Id. Even under Secretary Watt's increased 
rate of leasing, it would still take 137 years to evaluate the energy potential of the federal 
OCS. Id. at 370 (statement of Arthur Spaulding, Vice President and General Manager, 
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n and the Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n). 
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B. Leasing in Frontier Areas 
A major element of the Watt program was early leasing of fron­
tier OCS areas that had a high potential for hydrocarbon discovery, 
particularly frontier areas off the coast of Alaska. 55 In a statement by 
Secretary Watt before a House Subcommittee, the Secretary explained 
that "[t]here will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of high 
potential. Here we are talking about the frontier areas of offshore 
Alaska."56 
Through 1982, only 10% of the acreage leased had been in fron­
tier OCS regions outside the producing areas of the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Santa Barbara Channel. 57 Furthermore, as of 1980, only 
0.6% of Alaska's vast OCS area had been offered for lease, and only 
0.2% had ever been leased. S8 The Watt program, therefore, .provided 
for an overall 17% increase in lease sales over the Andrus Program, 
with major increases occurring in Alaska.59 Planned Alaska sales in­
creased by 60% from ten to sixteen sales. Alaska sales constituted 
38% of the total planned program sales, an increase from about 27% 
observed· in the Andrus plan.6O Scheduled lease sale dates were also 
advanced in the higher potential areas. 61 
C. Streamlining the oes Leasing Program 
"OCS sale preparation is a complex, participative process."62 
Under the traditional procedures,63 the first important prelease step 
55. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, u.s. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 
EMD-82-26, PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S NEW ACCELERATED OFFSHORE LEASING PRO­
GRAM REQUIRE ATTENTION 11 (1981) [hereinafter PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELER­
ATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM]; The Great Arctic Energy Rush, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 1983, 
at 52-53 [hereinafter The Great Arctic Energy Rush]. 
56. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
57. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET: 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM 1 (1982). 
58. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 7. See also oes Over­
sight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 355-56 (statement of John McKeever, Staff Geolo­
gist, Amoco Prod. Co., Alaska). 
59. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 6. 
60. Id. at 6-9. 
61. Id. at 10-11. 
62. Id. at 14. 
63. For discussions comparing the traditional leasing procedures against the stream­
lined leasing methods adopted by Secretary Watt, see 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE­
YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17-22; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY 
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7; Vass I, supra note 35, at 62­
64. 
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was the Call for Nominations issued by the Interior Department that 
designated certain acreage for leasing consideration.64 Industry, 
coastal states, and other concerned groups then nominated individual 
tracts to be included or deleted from the lease sale.65 Information re­
ceived in tract nominations was used to make a Tentative Tract Selec­
tion of tracts to be considered in a proposed lease sale.66 A Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was then prepared on these 
tracts.67 The DEIS discussed the likely effects of oil and gas leasing on 
each OCS tract to be offered,68 and additional tracts were deleted if the 
DEIS showed them to be especially sensitive to environmental 
damage.69 
After the DEIS had been circulated for public review and com­
ment, a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was written on 
the same tract-specific basis.70 The FEIS provided information to as­
sist the Secretary in deciding whether or not to hold a sale, to delete 
particular tracts, or to place restrictions on specific tracts.1 1 The 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) then calculated the value of 
the resources in each tract.72 The tracts remaining after this extensive 
narrowing process were then available to be offered for lease.73 If the 
Secretary decided to hold the lease sale, a Notice of Sale was published 
in the Federal Register referring to such matters as the details of the 
tracts to be leased, measures to avoid adverse environmental impacts, 
and special stipulations that may be imposed on leasing certain 
tracts.74 The lease sale itself would occur not less than thirty days 
64. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 62, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1469; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING 
PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. 
65. Id. See also PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, 
supra note 55, at 14. 
66. Id. 
67. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 62, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1469. 
68. Id. 
69. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 7. 
70. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1470. 
71. Id. 
72. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 7; PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 14. 
73. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1470. 
74. Id. 
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afterwards.75 "On the average, these successive procedures took forty­
two months to complete."76 
Secretary Watt approved proposals to streamline the.presale plan­
ning process. These changes in the OCS leasing system were designed 
to reduce the planning time of sales, increase the amount of acreage 
offered in each sale, permit early entry into OCS areas with high en­
ergy potential, and utilize market forces rather than the federal gov­
ernment to select areas for offshore leasing exploration.77 
Streamlining the presale planning process involved substantive 
changes in the manner in which the Mineral Management Service 
(MMS) prepared for OCS sales, and in the composition of the sales 
themselves. It involved "a shift in focus from studying the offering of 
a relatively small number of scattered tracts to studying the offering of 
entire planning areas,"78 and relied on interest in the marketplace to 
stimulate lease offerings.79 Under the Watt program, potential sales 
were studied in eight planning areas off the lower forty-eight states and 
ten areas off Alaska.80 These planning areas were based on geologic 
considerations, and basins were generally grouped together. Each sale 
involved one planning area.8! 
The streamlined leasing program initiated by Secretary Watt in­
troduced three basic changes into the prelease planning process: pre­
call activities, Call for Information, and Area Identification.82 Precall 
activities, which take place prior to the Call for Information, include 
the preparation by the MMS of a geology report, an environmental 
analysis, an exploration report, and modeling studies concerning so­
75. Id. at 64, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1471. 
76. Vass I, supra note 35, at 63 (footnote omitted). 
77. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Interior Proposes Final Five-Year oes Sale Plan, Oil & 
Gas J., May 24, 1982, at 44; Edwards, Reagan Administration Brings New Approach to 
Federal oes Leasing, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, at 203. 
78. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 232-33 (statement of J. Robin­
son West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior); 1 
FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17. 
79. oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 22, 1982, at 56 
[hereinafter oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces]; Reagan Energy Policy Plan 
Tied to Free Market, Oil & Gas J., July 20, 1981, at 22 [hereinafter Reagan Energy Policy 
Plan Tied to Free Market]. 
80. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 6-7. 
81. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson 
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
82. Industry Backs Area-Wide Sale ofoeS Blocks, Oil & Gas J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 54 
[hereinafter Industry Backs A rea- Wide Sale of oes Blocks]; Interior Fine Tunes Plan for 
Leasing on oes, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 4, 1982, at 73; Changes in oes Leasing Procedures 
Brighten U.S. Outlook Offshore, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, at 93; Edwards, supra note 77. 
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cioeconomic effects, oil spills, and air quality. Under the Watt pro­
gram, early submission of geology, exploration and development 
reports, combined with the areawide offering concept under the 
streamlined process accelerated the eventual preparation of the DEIS 
by about twenty-two months.83 
The second major change was an increase in private industry in­
volvement during the early stages of the leasing process. Whereas pre­
viously Department of the Interior personnel made unilateral 
determinations as to the areas to be leased, the new process utilizes a 
Call for Information issued to the private sector inviting comments 
from potential bidders regarding desirable leasing areas.84 Secretary 
Watt wanted "the market and not the Government [to] decide which 
tracts are the most promising [for the discovery of oil and gas], and 
which merit a priority in terms of scarce U.S. investment dollars."85 
The rationale for areawide offerings was as follows: 
[1] Significant domestic energy resources are believed to be 
located on the DeS, but the precise quantities and locations are un­
known because promising frontier areas have not been explored 
thoroughly. 
[2] Different geologists develop different interpretive views on 
the probable location of oil and gas in anyone planning area. 
[3] The best way to accelerate discovery of significant oil and 
gas deposits is to encourage companies to pursue unique and diverse 
exploration strategies based on these different views. 
[4] In the [past] process the Federal Government makes judg­
ments about which tracts are or are not likely to be bid· on. The 
streamlined process will allow companies to concentrate their ef­
forts on tracts they consider most promising, unless those tracts 
have been deleted for other reasons through the pre-sale planning 
process. 
[5] The diverse exploration strategies which will be tested 
under the streamlined process are necessary in order to fully test an 
area. Only a small percentage of a planning area can be expected to 
contain economically producible resources and it would probably 
slow the geologic delineation of an area if small portions of it are 
made available on a piecemeal basis.86 
83. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP. ON THE FIvE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 
13, at 22-29. 
84. Id. at 19. 
85. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 14-15 
(statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also id. at 11. 
86. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 
13, at 23. 
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The Interior Department believed that by broadening the range of 
possibilities from which industry could select to drill, it would expe­
dite the discovery of commercially viable deposits of oil and gas in the 
OCS.87 The petroleum industry supported replacing the Call for 
Nominations with a Call for Information. 88 
The third major change in the prelease planning process was the 
substitution of Area Identification for the tentative tract selection pro­
cess previously used. Area Identification formally announces the area 
on which the EIS analysis will be focused, and the area which will 
eventually be considered for leasing. Unlike the tentative tract selec­
tion process which focused its EIS analysis on specific individual 
tracts, the Area Identification process prepares an EIS for the entire 
planning area.89 
To accommodate the streamlined leasing process and the new 
definition of sale area, the Interior Department adopted a different ap­
proach to the preparation of environmental impact statements. Essen­
tially it involved two new procedures. The first was "telescoping," 
which is the simultaneous, rather than successive, execution of certain 
steps. An example of telescoping is issuing the proposed notice of sale 
during the same month in which the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (FEIS) is issued. The original practice had been to issue the 
proposed notice of sale two months after the FEIS.90 Another element 
of telescoping includes determining the scope of issues addressed in 
the EIS. This is called the scoping process and includes the MMS 
meeting with. federal, state, and local governments, as well as other 
interested parties in order to gather information and to identify the 
significant issues related to the proposed action. Scoping identifies in­
dividual concerns and assists in the formulation of possible alterna­
tives to the proposed action. Under the streamlined procedures, most 
87. Id. Secretary Watt maintained that the streamlined leasing process "will attract 
many competitors who will invest millions and billions of dollars in drilling operations that 
will prove successful in delivering oil and gas to American consumers." Senate Hearings on 
the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 12 (statement of James G. Watt, Secre­
tary of the Interior). 
88. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3: Hearings on Provisions of the Proposed Five­
Year Leasing Program and Its Impact on Offshore Operations and Examine the GAO Report 
on the Five-Year Program Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental 
Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 
(1982) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3] (statement of J. Robinson West, As­
sistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
89. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson 
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
90. Id. at 232-33; 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHED­
ULE, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
19 1990] SALE OF OIL AND GAS LEASES 
of the scoping meetings occur earlier than in past leasing practice and 
the early receipt of this data shortens the time required to prepare an 
EIS.91 
The second change in the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process involves the tiering of NEPA documents.92 Tiering 
an EIS eliminates repetitive discussions of the same issues and focuses 
on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental 
review.93 The EIS prepares for the first offering in a planning area, 
emphasizes analysis rather than description, and provides an assess­
ment of expected cumulative effects of exploration and development 
activity that might occur within the entire planning area if all the pe­
troleum resources in the planning area are developed. The NEPA 
document prepared for the second areawide offering updates the EIS 
from the 'first offering. Additional information includes results of 
ongoing environmental studies and monitoring projects; as well as 
data from any exploration activities that may have taken place.94 On 
the average, these streamlined procedures are completed in about 
twenty-one months regardless of the leasing area.95 
As noted, under an areawide leasing system, industry identifies its 
areas of leasing interest in the Call for Information. The DOl may 
still exclude tracts from the sale for environmental reasons or by 
adopting the recommendations of coastal states. However, under the 
areawide system, industry is permitted greater flexibility to choose 
where its investments in exploration will be made. The method of re­
source evaluation is also changed, and the evaluations on the suffi­
ciency of industry bids are made after the sale rather than before. 96 
91. I FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 
13, at 19, 22; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.25 (1988). 
92. oes Oversight Hearings-Pan 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Edwards, supra note 77, at 208. 
93. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (1988). 

Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has been prepared (such as a 

program or policy statement) and a subsequent statement or environmental as­

seSsment is then prepared on an action included within the entire program or 

policy (such as a site specific action) the subsequent statement or environmental 

assessment need only summarize the issues discussed in a broader statement and 

incorporate discussions from the broader statement by reference and shall con­

centrate on the issues specific to the subsequent action. 

Id. § 1502.20.. 
94. oes Oversight Hearings-Pan 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson 
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
95. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, aU!. 
96. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO 
THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OV·ERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON 
20 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
Industry criticized the tract nomination system because the DOl 
made its own determinations of resource potential and often refused to 
include many of the tracts nominated by industry in the sale. Other 
critics charged that the limited number of tracts in each sale slowed 
the leasing of OCS lands and depressed OCS production.97 Areawide 
leasing was adopted to provide industry with greater flexibility in se­
lecting the tracts which offer the best potential for commercial discov­
eries of oil and gas. The objectives are to stimulate the inventorying 
and production of OCS oil and gas resources by expanding the amount 
and location of acreage leased and increasing the rate of investment in 
exploration of OCS lands.98 
Industry strongly supports the concept of areawide leasing, claim­
ing that its increased participation in the exploration and development 
activity in the nation's OCS regions is a direct result of areawide leas­
ing.99 Areawide leasing provides for creative approaches to offshore 
exploration. It allows companies to bid on areas that were ignored by 
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, PUB. No. GAORCED-85-66, EARLY ASSESSMENT OF INTE­
RIOR'S AREA-WIDE PROGRAM FOR LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter 
EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM]; HOUSE REP. ON SECRE­
TARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. For discussions com­
paring DOl's previous tract selection process to its areawide leasing procedures, see EARLY 
ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra, at 43-46; I FINAL EIS 
SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17-24; HOUSE REP. 
ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. 
97. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 2. 
98. Id. at I; OCS Leasing Process-Part 1: Hearings on the Five- Year Draft Proposed 
Program for Oil and Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, and the State/Federal 
Consultation Process Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of 
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 84,457 (1986) 
[hereinafter Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1] (statement of Patricia E. Hughes, 
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office). 
99. Outer Continental Shelf Five-Year Program: Hearings on the Five-Year Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Proposed Program Before the Subcomm. on the Panama/ 
Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 334 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Five-Year Program] (statement of 
Dr. Theodore R. Eck, Chief Economist, Amoco Corp.); Hagar, GulfofMexico A rea- Wide 
Sales Draw Kudosfrom Operators, Oil & Gas. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 39; Industry Backs Area­
Wide Sale of OCS Blocks, supra note 82. For an industry view on areawide leasing, see 
NATIONAL OCEAN INDUS. ASS'N, AREA WIDE LEASING: NATIONAL BOON OR INDUSTRY 
BOONDOGGLE? AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE ON THE FIRST YEAR OF THE OCS AREA­
WIDE LEASING PROGRAM IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, (1984), reprinted in Hearings on OeS 
Five-Year Program, supra, at 197-212; Kelly, An Industry Perspective on Areawide Leasing 
(remarks presented at the U.S. Dep't of the Interior OCS PoliCy Committee Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1984), reprinted in Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings on Outer 
Continental Shelf Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 257-65 (1986) [hereinafter 
Hearings on OCS]. 
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others or that were not available under the tract selection system. 
Over the long term, industry maintains that areawide leasing will re­
sult in the location and development of more oil and gas than the tract 
selection system. lOO Areawide offerings also provide a more efficient 
means of gathering and using exploration information. The areawide 
system makes it possible for companies to follow promising geological 
formations because large areas are available for exploration. The 
larger the number of exploration opportunities, the greater the chance 
for new discoveries and the more efficiently scarce capital will be used 
for exploration. \01 
The shift from tract nomination to areawide leasing, however, 
was strongly opposed by environmental groups and coastal states. 
These groups allege that areawide leasing is nothing more than a "fire 
sale" and giveaway of the nation's resources, and because of the mag­
nitude of the sales, is a threat to the coastal environment. \02 As a 
result, the areawide leasing program was subject to unprecedented liti­
gation on a significant number of sales. \03 
II. OPPOSITION TO THE WAIT FIVE-YEAR OCS PLAN 
The Watt five-year plan for accelerated OCS oil and gas leasing 
received .extensive criticism from coastal states (particularly Massa­
chusetts, Alaska, and California), local governments, environmental­
100. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 121 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on Behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Hagar, supra note 99, at 40-42. 
See also Areawide Leasing Increases Rig Utilization Rates, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1985, at 9; Area­
wide Offerings are Best Solution, OFFSHORE, Mar. 1984, at 29; Gulf Sale Proves Merit of 
Area Concept, OFFSHORE, July 1983, at 33; LeBlanc, Flexure Play Spurs Area-Wide Bid­
ding, OFFSHORE, July 1983, at 35. 
101. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 121 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on Behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
102. Id. at 102 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.), and at 467 (statement of Jack Giberson, Chief Clerk, General Land 
Office, State of Texas); Outer Continental ShelfLeasing Activities: Hearing on Outer Conti­
nental Shelf Leasing Activities Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Supply of 
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (I984) [here­
inafter Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities] (statement of Elizabeth Raisbeck, Legislative 
Director, Friends of the Earth and the Coast Alliance); Crow, Critical Issues in OCS Activ­
ity Could Be Resolved This Summer, Oil & Gas J., July 2, 1984, at 19-20. 
103. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 407 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, 
Oceans, Coast and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); Hearing on OCS Five-Year 
Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 178 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts, 
and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE 
LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 51. 
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ists, and citizen groups.l04 These groups expressed five principal 
concerns about Secretary Watt's accelerated OCS leasing program. 
First, coastal states and local governments could not cope with such 
an expansion. IDS Second, the Department of the Interior and the pe­
troleum industry might not have the ability to manage and execute so 
vast a program. 106 Third, proposals to reduce or eliminate federal 
funding for ocean and coastal zone management programs, proposed 
at the same time oil and gas leasing was accelerated, threatened to 
seriously limit state and local governments' capacity to provide the 
necessary infrastructure and cope with the impacts of the leasing pro­
gram. 107 Fourth, environmental assessments would be less useful as 
planning documents. lOS Finally, the accelerated leasing schedule 
would not promote leasing at fair market value. 109 
A. 	 The Ability of Coastal States and Local Governments to Cope 
with Accelerated Leasing 
The pace and magnitUde of leasing under the Watt program 
threatened the ability of coastal states and local governments to cope 
effectively with such an expansion. 110 State and local governments 
maintained that they were unable to assess adequately the environ­
mental impact of leasing and plan for that impact. They also claimed 
that they were unable to comment effectively and participate in the 
104. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 224-25 (statement of Repre­
sentative Leon Panetta of California); Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule, 
supra note 4, at 45 (statement of Representative Don Young of Alaska); Crow, supra note 
102, at 19. 
105. 	 Crow, supra note 102, at 20. 
106. PITFALLS. IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 38-64. 
107. 	 oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 146. 
108. 	 Crow, supra note 102, at 20. 
109. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 50. 
110. The accelerated OCS lease schedule did "very little to accommodate the legiti­
mate concerns of the State of Alaska." oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 
457 (letter from Jay Hammond, Governor of Alaska, to James G. Watt, Secretary of the 
Interior). After reviewing the lease schedule, Governor Hammond commented: "Not sur­
prisingly, the local communities of coastal Alaska are overwhelmed by the proposed accel­
eration of OCS Leasing in their regions." Id. James Souby, Director of Policy 
Development and Planning for Governor Hammond, testified before Congress that: "Six­
teen oil and gas lease sales in 10 Alaskan planning areas totaling more than 550 million 
acres in the next 5 years are simply too much too soon. Seven of the offshore sales would 
be first time offerings in Alaskan frontier areas with formidable environmental conditions." 
GAO Disputes oes Revenue Estimate, Oil & Gas J., June 28, 1982, at 42. See also oes 
Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 423-56. 
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preleasing process. 111 
Coastal states sought an increased role in the federal OCS deci­
sionmaking which would vitally affect their interests. Coastal state 
and local government concerns over the Watt OCS plan produced dis­
cussions of a "Seaweed Rebellion"112 comparable to the inland "Sage­
brush Rebellion."113 At a meeting of western governors held in 
Ill. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 403-04 (statement of Mr. Al Aramburu, 
County Supervisor, Marin County, California); Crow, supra note 102, at 20. 
112. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, Salt Lake 
Tribune, Sept. II, 1981, at 2A, col. 3 [hereinafter Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater 
Say in Off-Shore Drilling]. 
113. In recent years, the western states have challenged federal ownership of public 
lands within their boundaries through the introduction of "Sagebrush Rebellion Acts" in 
state legislatures. These legislative proposals would shift the ownership of public lands 
from the federal government to the states. Such legislation was considered in the following 
states: Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Sim­
ilar legislation has also been filed in the United States Senate. Backman, Public Land Law 
Reform-Reflectionsfrom Western Water Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1,5-6. 
Western states recognize that the federal government's most direct impact on their 
future arises from its position as the owner and steward of about 733 million acres of pub­
licly-owned land, one-third of the land area of the United States. The majority of federal 
land ownership is in 12 western states. The percent of land owned by the federal govern­
ment within these states is as follows: Alaska, 86%; Arizona, 44%; California, 48%; Colo­
rado, 36%; Idaho, 64%; Montana, 30%; Nevada, 85%; New Mexico, 34%; Oregon, 49%; 
Utah, 61%; Washington, 31%, and Wyoming, 50%. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 19865 (1987). 
Within these federal lands are significant amounts of natural resources. Federallands 
contain 85% of the nation's oil, 72% of oil shale, 37% of the natural gas, 37% of the 
uranium ore, and 50% of geothermal resources. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LI­
BRARY OF CONG., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ENERGY FACTBOOK 58 (1980); Reagan 
Energy Policy Plan Tied to Free Market, supra note 79, at 22. While federal lands contain 
significant amounts of fossil fuels, production of these resources has been modest. The 
percentages of fossil fuel production on federally administered lands as a percent of total 
United States production for the year 1986 were as follows: crude oil, 19.2%; natural gas, 
30.4%; and coal, 22.8%. OFFICE OF ENERGY MARKETS AND END USE, ENERGY INFOR­
MATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1988 17 (1989) 
[hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL ENERGY REV.]. 
The United States is not the only country facing challenges to federal control over 
energy resources. Canada also faces the issue of whether control of domestic oil and gas 
development should be centered at the local or national level. For a discussion of the 
Canadian "snowshoe" rebellion, see Nagy, Sagebrush and Snowshoes: The Struggle for 
Natural Resource Control in the United States and Canada, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
247 (1981). For discussions on the Sagebrush Rebellion, see Nevada v. United States, 699 
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983); Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental 
Perspective on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982); Brodie, A Question of 
Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public 
Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: 
The Extent and Distribution ofFederal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982); Getches, Manag­
ing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RE­
SOURCES J. 279 (1982); Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law. Politics and 
Federal Lands. 14 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980); Mollison & Eddy. Jr., The Sagebrush 
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September 1981, Governor Jay Hammond of Alaska commented that 
the federal policy of offshore leasing appeared to be "a reduction of 
states' rights under the so-called 'New Federalism'" which demon­
strated "undue and unnecessary insensitivity" to coastal states. 114 
Governor Hammond claimed that "unless [the OCS leasing schedule 
was] amended [it] could do severe violence to those of us who live in 
[those] coastal areas."IlS In a letter to the Interior Department, he 
asserted that "the State of Alaska is firmly opposed to both the magni­
tude and pace of leasing proposed for the Alaska OCS region. . .." 116 
Governor Hammond further stated that "Alaskans are being asked to 
shoulder an inequitable portion of the risks and impacts inherent in oil 
and gas activities conducted in hazardous offshore waters."1l7 
Critics raised a number of specific objections to accelerated leas­
ing in offshore Alaska. The state has little of the social and govern­
mental infrastructure found in other areas of the United States that are 
subject to OCS development I 18 and did not have sufficient time under 
the accelerated OCS lease schedule to plan and provide for needed 
facilities and social services. The leasing program proposed by Inte­
rior Secretary Andrus provided an average planning time of twenty-six 
months for sales in the Gulf of Mexico and up to forty-one months for 
sales in Alaska. 1l9 These time frames reflected not only the different 
environmental characteristics of the two offshore regions, but also 
their differing degrees of infrastructure development. Under the Watt 
leasing program, however, sale planning steps were completed in 
about twenty-one months in both regions. 12o 
The state of California also opposed the accelerated OCS leasing 
Rebellion: A Simplistic Response to the Complex Problems 0/ Federal Land Management, 
19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1982); Titus, The Nevada Sagebrush Rebellion Act: A Question 
o/Constitutionality, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (1981); Wald & Temkin, The Sagebrush Rebel­
lion: The West Against Itself-Again, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 187 (1982); Note, 
The Property Power. Federalism. and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 
(1980); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 
UTAH L. REV. 505. 
114. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, supra note 
112, at 2A, col. 3. 
115. Id. 
116. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 457 (letter from Jay Ham­
mond, Governor of Alaska, to James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 275 (statement of Barbara Heller, Consultant, Envtl. Policy Center). 
119. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 11, 13. The leasing program under Secretary Andrus provided for 30 months to plan 
for a sale in the Pacific OCS region and 31 months for planning Atlantic OCS region sales. 
Id. at 13. 
120. Id. at 11, 13. 
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program, particularly lease sale number fifty-three in the Santa Maria 
Basin. 121 The proposed drilling there would occur near four of north­
ern California's most beautiful beaches, but would only produce a ten­
day national supply of petroleum. 122 As a result, congressional and 
other political sources also opposed the direction of the OCS leasing 
program in California. 123 On March 19, 1981, twenty-nine members 
of the California congressional delegation wrote to President Reagan 
121. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom Secretary of the Interior v. California, 
464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
122. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 373. The United States Geological 
Survey estimated that Sale No. 53 had a potential of 983 million barrels of petroleum. 
0pf/Jnents of the sale maintained that this amount did not justify the environmental risks 
of offshore drilling. Id. Industry, however, displayed unusual interest in the petroleum 
potential of the Santa Maria Basin. The sale drew $2.278 billion in high bids. Among the 
offers was one that established a record at that time for the biggest bonus for a single tract 
as well as the' highest per-acre bonus. Rintoui, California's Staggering Sale, OFFSHORE, 
July 1981, at 57. 
Phillips Petroleum Company and Chevron U.S.A., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Com­
pany of California, paid a record for that date of $333.6 million for the right to drill for oil 
on a single 57oo-acre offshore tract in the Santa Maria Basin off Point Arguello, California. 
Test drilling in the Santa Maria Basin confirmed the existence of a major oilfield, and 
experts now predict that the Santa Maria Basin could be the largest single American oil 
discovery since Alaska's Prudhoe Bay in 1968. Originally the field's potential reserves were 
estimated at 100 million barrels of oil. Since the test drilling, however, projections have 
risen to put the ultimate potential between 300 million and one billion barrels of oil. A 
Billion-Barrel Find?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1982, at 84; Black-Gold Rush, TIME, Nov. 29, 
1982, at 63. 
123. The controversy generated over including the Santa Maria Basin'in OCS lease 
offerings is illustrated by the remarks of California Congressman John Burton, who re­
ferred to Mr. Watt in congressional hearings as "the Secretary of the Inferior." OCS Over­
sight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 9. Congressman Burton further stated: 
So it is obvious that lock, stock and barrel [Secretary Watt] is in the pocket 
of the oil industry, he is going to destroy the fishing industry in our area, he is 
going to destroy the ecology of our area, and he is going to do it all in the name 
of-I do not know what, but I am sure he can think of something. 
I think it is outrageous exploitation .... 
Id. at 10. 
California Congressman Paul McCloskey, however, questioned the environmentalist's 
perspective on opposing the lease sale: 
[T]he protection of one of the most beautiful coastlines in the world is impor­
tant, but just as serious is the national need to avoid the necessity of going to war 
in the Persian Gulf. . . 
... I want to confess that in comparing these two perspectives the desire to 
prevent going to war in the Middle East and to prevent spending an additional 
$38 million in increased defense expenditures, outweighs the possibility of having 
to say as a Representative from California, yes, we are willing to go to war to 
protect our source of oil, but we are not willing to drill off our own coast because 
of a desire to protect our own environment. The standard environmentalist's per­
spective on the lease-sale seems a little hollow unless we have clear evidence that 
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asking him to overturn Secretary Watt's action and exclude four 
northern California basins-Eel River, Point Arena, Bodega, and 
Santa Cruz-from OCS leasing.124 Senator Alan Cranston, a Califor­
nia Democrat, called for Watt's resignation, and the Republican Party 
Chairman of California, Mr. Tirso del Junco, warned Secretary Watt 
in a June 1, 1981 letter that a decision to open up certain offshore 
reserves along the coast of California for oil and gas drilling could 
"severely hamper" the election of Republican candidates 10 
California. 125 
Opponents of Secretary Watt's plan to lease California's OCS 
were concerned about the environmental impacts of nearshore devel­
opment. 126 The majority of California's OCS, particularly in southern 
California, drops rapidly from the coast reaching a depth of 350 me­
ters at an offshore distance of approximately twelve miles. Any fed­
eral OCS devel9pment must occur very close to shore because present 
the danger of drilling represents a real danger of environmental damage to the 
coast. 
Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 5-6 (statement of Representative Paul Mc­
Closky of California). 
Wallace Stokes, a private citzen, also challenged the environmentalists' view of OCS 
development of the California coast. He stated before a House subcommittee on OCS 
oversight: 
Individuals and representatives of organizations have appeared before you today 
representing almost every creature of the deep in California's vast off-shore inven­
tory of sea life, but who has spoken for man? We speak of protecting man's 
environment and yet ignore the fact that man is a social being. An economics 
guided and energy-consuming creature that is a very important component of the 
world's total environment. 
Today I appear before you as a private citizen attempting to speak for man, 
particularly the sector of our citizenry who are the urban poor. 
On behalf of the urban poor, Mr. Stokes stated: 
It is all well and good for those coastline residents to express concerns for preser­
vation of the unique beauty and environment, but it is of little value and abso­
lutely no help to that automobile worker in Milpitas thrown out of a job because 
of rising energy costs. We can talk about environmental protection for the whale, 
but it doesn't address the very real human need of the San Francisco Tenderloin 
resident and her inability to maintain an adequate diet because of escalating en­
ergy costs. 
Assuming for the moment that the USGS estimates are correct, the oil in lease­
hold 53 is projected to make 10,000 jobs. Can we neglect this impact on [the] 
unemployed in this Nation? 
Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 434-35 (statement of Mr. Wallace Stokes). 
124. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 8-9 (statement of Represen­
tative John Burton of California). 
125. 12 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 247 (June 19, 1981). 
126. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 58-61 (statement of Sena­
tor Pete Wilson of California). 
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technology limits drilling to areas less than 350 meters in depth.127 
California coastal communities voiced three concerns about near­
shore OCS development. First, the risk of an oil spill could have a 
devastating effect on the economies of coastal communities that in 
large part depended on the fishing, recreation, and tourist indus­
tries. 128 A second concern with nearshore development was increased 
air pollution. 129 Since the prevailing winds off southern California are 
onshore, nearshore development would increase air pollution. 130 
Coastal communities, already violating the Clean Air Act, objected to 
nearshore OCS drilling because the increase in pollution levels would 
result in stricter air quality control standards and growth restric­
tions. 131 The final concern with nearshore OCS development was vis­
ual pollution. 132 Oil platforms located twelve to fifteen miles off the 
coast were offensive to residents of coastal communities and would 
reduce property values and hinder the tourism business. 133 
Opponents of the Watt leasing plan also maintained that as the 
third largest oil producing state in the nation, California already con­
tributed its share to national energy needs. 134 The amount of oil to be 
127. Id. at 58. 
128. Id. at 58-59. 
129. Id. at 60. 
130. Id. 
131. "According to the California Air Resources Board, the emissions associated 
with one exploratory drilling operation are equivalent to 5,000 1982 passenger cars travel­
ing 50 miles per day for one year." Id. 
132. Id. at 61. 
133. Id.; Energy and National Security-5, u.s. Must Balance Its Environmental. 
Energy Concerns, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 27. The objections of California coastal 
communities to the visual pollution of oil rigs illustrates the regional differences to domes­
tic oil development. The Gulf States, particularly Louisiana and Texas which have exper­
ienced the majority of OCS drilling assert that Californians "perceive ... oes energy 
development to be the same ... as waste disposal, a necessary obligation but preferably 
done in someone else's backyard." Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 2. 
See also Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 29, Miscues Add New Twists 
to Saga a/Oil. Gas Work o./fCalijornia, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 15. The Gulf States 
complain that Californians want to live their lives without producing for the rest of the 
country any of the products that they enjoy consuming and that is not fair. Hearing on 
OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 29; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 102; 
Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part ], supra note 98, at 25. 
The California approach to visual pollution-because you do not like the way a drill­
ing rig looks, you do not drill-is not a rational solution to the problem. The nation needs 
to determine whether there are recoverable reserves in the federal OCS and an accurate 
inventory can only be made by drilling. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 95. 
134. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 46-47, 56, (statement of 
Senator Pete Wilson of California); Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 103. Opponents of 
leasing California's OCS claim that the relatively small amounts of oil to be discovered do 
not justify the risks of development. California's OCS will most likely not provide enough 
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recovered in the OCS areas of California might be significant to a sin­
gle leasing company, but leasing opponents claimed that there did not 
appear to be enough oil to justify taking the risks of development. 135 
In this case, the state of California, environmentalists, and citizen 
groups claimed that the nation's energy needs did not outweigh the 
potential disaster to local interests that OCS development could 
bring. 136 
In response to California's argument that the environmental risks 
of offshore drilling were "too great for the amount of petroleum to be 
found in California's OCS, Secretary Watt replied that the risks were 
extremely limited and "directly associated with the" quantity of oil 
found. Small or no dis~overies of oil result in virtually no risk. A 
theoretically higher risk would occur only if larger quantities of oil are 
found. And if that is the case, the value of production to the Nation 
substantially increases." 137 
Secretary Watt maintained that a far bigger danger to the coastal 
environment than the development of OCS energy resources was the 
risk of oil spills from giant tankers carrying foreign oil to the United 
States. 138 The Secretary also pointed out that California "conducted 
petroleum to satisfy the nation's oil needs through the end of the century, the end of the 
decade, or even through one year, nor will it free the country from dependence on foreign 
oil. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 55 (statement of Senator Pete 
Wilson of California). 
135. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 47, 54 (statement of Sena­
tor Pete Wilson of California). 
136. Id.; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986­
Part 5: Hearings of the Testimony of Public Witnesses, Energy and Related. Programs, 
Before the Subcomm on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House 
Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-32 (1985) [hereinafter House Hearings 
on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior Appropriations-Part 5] (statement of Tom Bradley, 
Mayor, City of Los Angeles, California); Crow, supra note 102, at 20. 
137. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 516-17 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt summarized the debate over leasing OCS 
lands off the coast of California in the following manner: 
Those opposing sale 53 have tried to cast the issue as one of either oil and 
gas, or other important values. Experience in the Gulf of Mexico in Federal and 
State waters, and off southern California in Federal and State waters, shows that 
it is not an either/or question. Offshore oil and gas is compatible with other uses 
and values of the ocean. 
Id. at 516-17. 
138. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 25, 1981, at 49; OCS Oversight Hearings­
Part 2, supra note I, at 50 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Oil 
imports by massive tankers into the United States are more of a threat to our coastal envi­
ronment than spillage from OCS production. The oes program is the nation's safest en­
ergy extraction program. Of the 60 largest oil spills recorded in American waters, 59 were 
caused by tanker spills; only one was the result of OCS oil and gas activity. During the last 
decade, OCS-related oil spills totaled 84,000 barrels. In contrast, just one recent tanker 
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numerous lease sales within state waters at the same time it opposed 
federal OCS lease sales.139 He further noted that California is the larg­
spill involving the British tanker ALVENUS spilled 30,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of 
Mexico. OTA Report: Hearing on a Report by the Office of Technology Assessment: "Oil 
and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater" Before the Subcomm. on Panama Ca­
nal/Outer Continental Shelfof the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing on OTA Rep.] (statement of Representative 
Jack Fields of Texas); Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 4-5 
(statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas). This one tanker incident dumped more 
oil into United States waters than the total oil discharged by all OCS activities during the 
eight year period from 1976 through 1983. During this period, oil spills from tankers 
caused 21 times as much pollution as all energy development activities on the OCS. Hear­
ings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 86. 
The success of the OCS safety record is ilIustrated.by the fact that in the last decade an 
average of five barrels of oil were spilled for every one million barrels produced on the OCS. 
Hearing on OTA Rep., supra, at 29 (statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas). In 
1985, only 1600 barrels of oil were spilled nationwide as a result of OCS energy activity. 
Oil production in that year was almost 400 million barrels. Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev. 
Plan, supra note 4, at 125-26 (statement of Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior). 
The threat of oil spills is the single major fear from leasing California's OCS. How­
ever, the total oil spilled in California's offshore waters from OCS operations from 1970 
through 1987 is only 210 barrels. That compares with discharges into California's OCS 
waters of about one million barrels of oil and grease from the Los Angeles treatment plant, 
five million barrels from San Luis Obispo to San Diego, and two million barrels from natu­
ral seeps during that period. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria­
tions for 1988--Part 9: Hearings on the Department of the Interior Budget for Fiscal Year 
1988 Before the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the 
House Comm. on Appropriations, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 685-86 (1987). 
In an extensive study on the effects of offshore oil and natural gas development on the 
coastal zone, the Congressional Research Service concluded that "offshore OCS production 
will be less damaging to the environment than importing a like amount of petroleum." 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CoNG., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A STUDY 
ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE 
COASTAL ZoNE 1 (1976) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
DEV. ON THE COASTAL ZONE]. The Congressional Research Service stated: 
Most oil pollution in the oceans comes from vessels, especially tankers, and 
from waste oil in municipal and industrial effluents. A five-percent reduction in 
oil pollution from either of these sources would have a more positive impact on 
the marine environment than elimination of all offshore production. Transporta­
tion (tankers primarily) contributes an estimated 35 percent of all ocean oil pollu­
tion. River and urban runoff contributes 31 percent, and offshore production 1.3 
percent. 
Id. at l. 
139. Final Five-Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental 
Shelf: Hearings to Review the Secretary ofthe Interior's Proposed Five- Year Plan for Oil and 
Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Supply 
of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS LeaSing Plan] (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior 
Appropriations-Part 5, supra note 136, at 30-32 (statement of Tom Bradley, Mayor, City 
of Los Angeles, California), and at 188-92 (statement of Robert Moeller, President, Yolo 
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est gasoline consuming state in the nation, and therefore has a respon­
sibility to meet its own consumer petroleum needs as well as 
contribute to the energy supply of the country.l40 The controversy 
over leasing California's OCS, therefore, was "the classic example of 
the broad public interests versus local interests and, as is often the 
case, local concerns do not always reflect national or even regional 
needs."141 
Interior officials maintained that if the United States were "to op­
erate on a principle that every time you drill a well it has to carry the 
potential of carrying the entire Nation for months on end, there would 
be no drilling ... at all."142 The nation's supply of petroleum comes 
from thousands of leases across the country, each contributing its own 
share of petroleum production. Exempting offshore tracts from OCS 
development has reduced employment opportunities143 and resulted in 
County Farm Bureau) (California is the largest agricultural state in the nation, and its 
agricultural production is dependent upon abundant energy supplies); Each Stalled OCS 
Sale a Missed Chance/or a More Secure u.s. Energy Future, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 
21 [hereinafter Each Stalled OCS Sale a Missed Chance for a More Secure U.S. Energy 
Future]. 
Secretary Watt stated in congressional testimony that: 
While criticizing us, California has been properly issuing hundreds of drilling 
permits within State waters. In fact, since 1979, Governor Brown has been issu· 
ing offshore oil drilling permits in the Santa Barbara Channel. It must be 
remembered that the California leases are within three miles of the coastline and 
the beaches. The State's activities are what you see; the Federal activities affect 
the lands far out under the ocean waters. 
Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 21 (statement of 
James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
140. ·OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 56 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev. Plan, supra note 
4, at 69. California is the third largest user of gasoline in the world, exceeded only by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 
69, 168. This oil dependence is largely due to a lifestyle built on the automobile. Californi­
ans consume more fuel per person than any other state in the nation. Hearings on OCS, 
supra note 99, at 102-03. In fact, the California Energy Commission predicts that by 1991, 
the state's transportation sector alone will consume more oil than the entire nation pro­
duces. Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 168 (statement of Representa­
tive Daniel Lungren of California). 
141. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt's argument that special interest groups are 
primarily responsible for the opposition to leasing California's OCS is supported by a 1983 
state-wide survey of voters in which 56% of the population polled favored new OCS devel­
opment off the coast of California. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 450. 
142. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 373. 
143. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't o/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra 
note 136, at 196 (statement of Marilyn Quinn, Youth for Energy Independence), at 221-22 
(statement of Larry Luera, California Chapter of the League of United Latin Am. Citi­
zens), and at 231-32 (statement of Donald C. Cobb, Vice President, Black Business Ass'n of 
Los Angeles). 
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the steady decline of oil production from OCS lands. l44 Annual OCS 
oil production declined from 418 million barrels of oil in 1971 to 277 
million barrels in 1980, a 33% decrease. 145 Secretary Watt, therefore, 
claimed that the national interest involved in developing offshore oil 
and gas reserves went beyond state objections to offshore drilling 
under the Department of the Interior's OCS program. 146 
B. 	 Department of the Interior's Ability to Manage the Accelerated 

OCS Program, and Industry's Capacity to Explore One 

Billion Offshore Acres 

A second concern with Secretary Watt's five-year leasing plan 
was the Department of the Interior's ability to manage the accelerated 
OCS program and the petroleum industry's capacity to explore one 
billion offshore acres. 
1. 	 The DOl's ability to manage the accelerated OCS program 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 
(OCSLAA) requires the Department of the Interior to estimate for 
Congress the money and full-time permanent positions needed to sup­
port a revised or new leasing schedule. 147 The Interior Department 
estimated that it could administer the accelerated leasing program 
with forty-two million dollars less than was estimated in the June 1980 
lease schedule prepared by Secretary Andrus (a 5.6% reduction) and 
with 948 fewer full-time positions (an 11 % reduction). While reduc­
ing its budget and staff, the Interior Department offered more offshore 
acreage through accelerated OCS lease sales than it had in the past, 
144. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 234 (statement of J. Robinson 
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
145. 	 Id. at 234, 239. 
146. Id. at 56 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Offshore Leas­
ing Hearings, supra note 53, at 517 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
Secretary Watt explained: 
The overriding national interest dictates that the DCS exploration program 
be carried on. We must know the resources at hand. This is recognized by con­
gressional action and by statute. The criticism raised to date simply does not 
balance the very small risks as compared to potential value of the likely produc­
tion. Sale 53 is a step in implementing the intent of Congress to meet the overrid­
ing national need to increase domestic oil and gas production. There can be no 
increase in production until we know if it is there. 
Id. at 517. See also OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 64 (statement of 
. James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior); House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior 
Appropriations-Part 5, supra note 136, at 230 (statement of Donald C. Cobb, Vice Presi­
dent, Black Business Ass'n of Los Angeles); Each Stalled OCS Sale a Missed Chance for a 
More Secure u.s. Energy Future, supra note 139, at 21. 
147. 	 43 U.S.c. § 1344(b) (1982). 
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primarily in frontier areas. The Interior Department did not explain 
how the simultaneous reductions in program funding and staffing and 
implementation of the accelerated leasing schedule would be 
accomplished. 148 
The U.S. Comptroller General questioned the adequacy of DOl's 
funding and staffing estimates. In the opinion of the Comptroller Gen­
eral, given the accelerated leasing program, funding and staffing needs 
for the OCS program would exceed current projections if the program 
goals were to be achieved. 149 
2. 	 The petroleum industry's capacity to increase exploration for 
offshore energy resources 
Citizen groups also questioned the extent of the petroleum indus­
try's capacity to explore and develop the vast quantities of new OCS 
acreage offered under the accelerated program. 150 The history of OCS 
development shows that the petroleum industry has been, and proba­
bly will continue to be, slow in developing the offshore lands it 
leases. 151 A 1981 report by the Energy Action Foundation, surveying 
the worldwide lease holdings and production rates of twenty major oil 
companies, found that the companies increased their holdings of unde­
veloped oil and gas lands by over 43% from 1976 to 1980, but in­
creased their acreage in production by only 2.5%. In 1976, the twenty 
major oil companies had twenty-four acres in production for every 100 
acres held inactive. In 1980, the number of acres in production had 
declined to seventeen for every 100 acres leased but not producing. 152 
As of 1981, the oil industry had leased only 3% of the Alaska, Califor­
nia, and Atlantic OCS land initially considered for lease, and many 
tracts that the industry did not explore and develop were returned to 
the federal government. 153 
148. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 38, 40. 
149. Id. at 43. 
150. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 224 (statement of Representa­
tive Leon Panetta of California). 
151. Fair Warning, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 17. 
152. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 62. 
153. R. TINNEY, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION: CAPABILITIES AND CON­
STRAINTS 5 (1981) (prepared for the Center for Envtl. Educ.), reprinted in Hearings on 
OCS Lease Sales-Part 1, supra note 12, at 513-71. The Comptroller General, however, 
concluded that the petroleum industry has been diligent in exploring and developing leased 
lands. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. EMD-81­
48, REPORT.TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF REGULATIONS-AFTER FEDERAL LEAS­
ING-ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 41-47 (1981). See 
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Few studies analyzed the petroleum industry's capacity to handle 
the accelerated leasing program. Furthermore, the Department of the 
Interior saw no need for such studies. Secretary Watt maintained that 
the availability of OCS lease offerings should not be determined by the 
industry's capabilities. 154 Nevertheless, a report for the Center for En­
vironmental Education (CEE) concluded that accelerated OCS devel­
opment will be constrained by a shortage of available mobile offshore 
drilling rigs, a lack of qualified personnel, the limits of oil and gas 
technology, and a shortage of capital. 155 According to the CEE re­
port, the offshore oil and gas industry did not have the capacity to 
explore and develop the OCS lands offered under the accelerated leas­
ing program. 156 
The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, criticized the 
CEE findings. The GAO concluded that the petroleum industry was 
fully capable of increasing its offshore activities, although the exact 
level of the increased activity was uncertain. It maintained that the 
level of increased participation depended upon the economics of oil 
development and the predictability of the leasing schedule rather than 
also Government Charges ofOperator Footdragging on Federal Leases Exposed as False Is­
sue, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 107; GAO: Industry Diligent on Federal Leases, Oil & 
Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 129. 
There are 117,000 oil and gas leases on federal onshore lands totaling 100 million acres 
but only six million acres are in production. Furthermore, between 75% and 80% of fed­
eral onshore leases expire without the submittal of drilling proposals. OCS Oversight Hear­
ings-Pan 1, supra note 36, at 7 (statement of Representative John Burton of California). 
Congressional opponents of the Watt OCS program questioned the rationale of accelerated 
leasing when oil companies were not fully developing leases. It was pointed out that "there 
[were] nearly 700 leases held by oil companies on Federal OCS lands totaling 3.5 million 
acres with no drilling being conducted in those areas." Id. The OCSLA Amendments 
prohibit the issuance of a lease if the bidder is not meeting due diligence requirements on 
other OCS leases. The Act states: "No bid for a lease may be submitted if the Secretary 
finds, after notice and hearing, that the bidder is not meeting due diligence requirements on 
other leases." 43 U.S.c. § 1337(d) (1982). For a discussion on the diligence of industry 
exploration of federal onshore oil and gas leases, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
PUB. No. GAO/EMD-82-82, ARE LEASEHOLDERS ADEQUATELY EXPLORING FOR OIL 
AND GAS ON FEDERAL LANDS? (1982). 
154. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 55. 
155. R. TINNEY, supra note 153, at 5. 
156. Id. at 46. The Watt accelerated program was not the first time that industry'S 
capacity to explore expanded OCS leasing was questioned. Studies by the Federal Energy 
Administration and the National Petroleum Council concluded that industry lacked the 
capacity to respond to the Interior Department's proposal to lease 10 million OCS acres in 
1975. NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S PROPOSED ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF OIL 
AND GAS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (1975) [hereinafter NAT'L OCEAN 
POL'y STUD.]. 
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on the magnitude of OCS lease offerings. ls7 The offshore petroleum 
industry also claimed that it had the capacity to increase its activities 
to meet the accelerated leasing schedule. ISS . 
C. Funding for Ocean and Coastal Programs 
In fiscal year 1982, at the same time the Interior Department was 
vastly accelerating OCS oil and gas leasing,IS9 the Reagan administra­
tion proposed the elimination of federal funding for state implementa­
tion of the Coastal Zone Management (CZM) program,16O the Coastal 
Energy Impact (CEI) program, and the National Sea Grant (NSG) 
program. 161 This funding provides grants and loans to mitigate the 
adverse impact of coastal energy development. 162 
The Reagan administration attempted to justify the proposed 
budget cuts on several grounds. First, the administration argued that 
federal CZM assistance had largely fulfilled its intended purpose-to 
help states develop and implement CZM programs-with twenty-five 
approved state programs covering 78% of the coastline. Thus, states 
should now be expected to fully fund the program that manages their 
coastal zones. Second, since many of the state CZM programs had 
been in existence for several years and were an integral part of the 
states' overall environmental protection activities, they were unlikely 
to be abandoned because of the withdrawal of federal funding. 163 
Third, economic growth resulting from energy resource development 
on federal lands--either onshore or offshore-should create new tax 
bases which would, in the long run, compensate for associated im­
pacts. Fourth, the federal government still provided funding for com­
munity facilities and services through a wide variety of categorical and 
block grant programs-for instance, community development and 
sewage treatment plant construction grants from the Environmental 
Protection Agency. States and their political subdivisions had the op­
157. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 50. See also id. at 50-64. 
158. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 88, at 33 (statement of E. A. Ward­
well, Chairman, Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n); id. at 39 (statement of Paul Kelly, Corporate 
Vice President, Zapata Corp., on behalf of the Infl Ass'n of Drilling Contractors); OCS 
Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 363-69 (statement of Charles Matthews, Presi­
dent, Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
159. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36 (statement of Sarah 
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
160. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988). 
161. See 33 U.S.c. §§ 1121-1131 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
162. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 146; Chasis, The Coastal Zone 
Management Act: A Protective Mandate, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 25 (1985). 
163. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36. 
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portunity to target these sources of assistance to areas experiencing the 
impact of energy development. Fifth, many port facilities were cur­
rently underutilized due to declines in various coastal industrial activi­
ties. The existence of this underutilized capacity made it unlikely that 
the type of boomtown activity motivating the CEI program would re­
sult.i64 Finally, the administration considered further funding inap­
propriate when balanced against the need to reduce the federal budget 
deficit and taxes. 165 
The proposed budget cuts would have effectively terminated the 
only national programs for comprehensive coastal management and 
protection. Withdrawal of federal funds would have caused the termi­
nation or limitation of state coastal programs166 and would have sig­
nificantly impaired the ability of state and local governments to plan 
for and ameliorate the adverse impacts of OCS oil and gas 
deve1opment. 167 
In a survey of its member states, the Coastal States Organization 
concluded that the termination of federal funding would destroy or 
seriously impair 80% of existing state CZM programs. 168 "The result 
will be that the existing statutory review responsibilities and proce­
dures for OCS and other coastal-related development activities would 
be seriously diminished, affecting the rate at which permits could be 
issued."169 This would in tum affect the rate at which energy develop­
ment projects could proceed. 
Opponents of budget cuts for the nation's ocean and coastal pro­
grams identified seven reasons why the Reagan administration should 
support continued funding for national coastal programs. First, the 
coast is a national resource. Coastal facilities and marine environ­
164. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of W. Kenneth 
Davis, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy). 
165. Id. The elimination of the Coastal Zone Management Program would have 
saved the federal government approximately $179 million through 1986. The termination 
of the Coastal Energy Impact Program would have saved $158 million from the federal 
budget through 1986. Oceanography Miscellaneous-Part 1: Hearings on Coastal Zone 
Management Budget Cuts Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 445-46 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings 
on CZM Budget Cuts] (statement of James Walsh, Acting Administrator, Nat'l Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce). 
166. S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 112]. 
167. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36 (statement of Sarah 
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
168. Hearings on CZM Budget Cuts, supra note 165, at 522 (statement of Sarah 
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
169. S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 10. 
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ments serve people throughout the nation, not just local residents. 17o 
Moreover, the coastal zone contains some of the most biologically pro­
ductive areas in the country.17I Second, the CZM program was the 
only national program that dealt comprehensively with. the manage­
ment of coastal resources. l72 Third, the CZM program established a 
management framework that could deal with contemporary coastal 
development problems. 173 Fourth, if CZM programs were discontin­
ued, it would cost millions of dollars to reestablish them in the fu­
ture. 174 Coastal states would have lost staff members who had 
developed an expertise in coastal issues. 175 Fifth, with the acceleration 
of OCS leasing, a resource management program was even more essen­
tial for the protection of the marine environment. Sixth, it was unrea­
sonable for the federal government to accelerate OCS leasing, yet fail 
to provide coastal states with funds to deal with the impacts of acceler­
ated leasing. The burden of supporting accelerated OCS development 
should not be placed upon coastal states that had limited opportunities 
to recover associated impact costs. Finally, CZM programs were cost 
effective. The yearly budget for the CZM program was only thirty­
seven million dollars. This was a small price to pay for a comprehen­
sive national program of coastal resource management. 176 
According to the coastal states, the elimination of the CZM and 
CEI programs would severely limit their opportunity for meaningful 
participation in the OCS decisionmaking process. Coastal states 
barred from such participation might tum increasingly to litigation to 
challenge individual lease sales. The Department of the Interior's at­
tempt to accelerate OCS development might suffer major delays from 
170. Hearings on CZM Budget Cuts, supra note 165, at 483 (statement of Dr. Marc 
Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). See also id. at 513 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior 
Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
171. Id. at 513 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.). 
172. Id. at 483 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). 
173. Id. at 484 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). The 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) has proved to be a flexible law that can handle 
changing problems. For example, in 1976, the CZMA was used to deal with concerns of 
state and local governments about the adverse impacts from OCS oil and gas development. 
In 1978, the CZMA provided funds to renew the urban waterfront for recreation and tour­
ism. Thus, in the past, CZMA's management capability has been efficiently used to address 
new problems. If retained, this management capability could be expanded to address future 
problems. If it is not retained, the nation will have to pay for an entire new management 
framework sometime in the future. Id. 
174. Id. at 485 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). 
175. S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 12. 
176. Id, 
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such litigation. 177 
Moreover, limiting coastal state participation in oes policymak­
ing violates the OeSLAA and the congressional intent behind its en­
actment. One purpose of the OeSLAA is to involve coastal states and 
local governments in policy planning for oes oil and gas develop­
ment. 178 The OeSLAA itself acknowledges that offshore energy de­
velopment may cause adverse impacts on coastal states and local 
governments. 179 Therefore, coastal states and local governments are 
to be. provided with comprehensive assistance to anticipate and ame­
liorate the adverse impacts of oes oil and gas development. Such 
assistance must include timely access to information, an opportunity 
to participate in the formulation of policy and planning decisions, and 
an opportunity to review and comment on final decisions. 18o 
A strong system of coastal management and energy impact pro­
grams would. benefit accelerated OCS development rather than deter 
it. The termination of federal financial support for the eZM and eEl 
programs would constitute "monumental bad faith on the part of the 
[Reagan] administration and a continuation of the very short-sighted, 
arrogant and negative approach of the Department of the Interior."181 
D. Environmental Concerns 
Environmental concerns related to areawide leasing include the 
possible inabi~ity of coastal states to assess and plan for the impacts of 
oes development and the question of whether meaningful environ­
177. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 48-49. See also S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 12. 
178. 43 U.S.C. § 1801(10)-(11) (1982). The House report on the OCSLA Amend­
ments states: 
A major purpose ... is to involve the states and affected local areas within the 
States in the entire exploitation process to a greater degree. The bill provides an 
opportunity for them to participate in the decisionmaking process with regard to 
the overall leasing program of the Secretary, and individual development and pro­
duction plans of the oil companies. The States and local areas are also supplied 
with information so that they will be able to plan for and ameliorate the on-shore 
consequences of off-shore development, and with assistance in coping with the on­
shore impacts of such development. Involving States in the process from the be­
ginning should avoid time-consuming lawsuits later. 
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 1457. 
179. 43 U.S.c. §§ 1332(4), 1801(10) (1982). 
180. Id. §§ 1332(4), 1801(11), 1802(4)-(6) (1982). 
181. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 285 (statement of Michael 
Fischer, Executive Director, California Coastal Comm'n). 
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mental impact statements can be prepared for entire planning areas. 182 
1. Planning for the impacts of oes development 
Critics of areawide leasing assert that the large, diverse areas of­
fered for lease in areawide sales, normally 30 to 100 million acres, and 
the uncertainty of which tracts will actually be leased, make it difficult 
for coastal states and local governments to evaluate and plan for the 
potential impacts from OCS development. 183 Areawide leasing has 
been called "too much, too fast."184 An accurate assessment of im­
pacts cannot be made since the potential impacts are difficult to iden­
tify in such large areas. 185 The very breadth of the areawide 
designation reduces the possibility that any particular locality will be 
affected and diminishes planning by state governments as they may be 
unwilling to allocate scarce resources to plan for impacts that are so 
speculative that they are unlikely to occur. 186 It is argued that because 
of the diversity in the environmental and socioeconomic characteris­
tics of the nation's OCS areas, the DOl must identify the location of 
proposed sales with greater specificity.187 
This challenge to areawide leasing finds some statutory basis in 
the OCSLAA. Section 18(a) of the OCSLAA requires the Secretary of 
the Interior to develop a "schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, 
as precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activ­
ity."188 The specificity requirement in section 18(a) notifies state and 
local governments of OCS activities off their coasts in order to allow 
them time to prepare and plan for the accompanying impacts. 189 
When Secretary Watt announced his areawide leasing plan, it was 
challenged in court on the basis that the 1982-87 areawide leasing pro­
182. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't a/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra 
note 136, at 68-69. 
183. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102-03 (statement 
of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
184. OCS Leasing Process-Part 2: Hearings on the Five-Year Draft Proposed Pro­
gram/or Oil and Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, and the State/Federal Consul­
tation Process, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Leasing 
Process-Part 2] (statement of Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol Bay Coastal Resource 
Servo Area Bd.). 
185. Department a/the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations/or 1986: Hear­
ings 0/ the Testimony of Public Witnesses. Department 0/ the Interior and Related Pro­
grams-Part 8 Be/ore the Subcommittee on the Department 0/ the Interior and Related 
Agencies a/the House Comm. on Appropriations. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) [hereinaf­
ter House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't 0/ the Interior Appropriations-Part 8]. 
186. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
187. Id. at 1303. 
188. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). 
189. California V. Watt, 668 F.2d at 1304. 
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gram lacked specificity190 since each planning area was scheduled as 
one lease sale, even though only a portion of each area would actually 
be leased. 191 In California v. Watt,192 the court rejected this argument 
on the grounds that section 18(a) only required as much specificity "as 
possible."193 The Secretary could not know what parts of a planning 
area would be leased before a Call for Information was made and sub­
sequent procedures were carried out. 194 
The petitioners also argued that the large size of the planning ar­
eas violated section 18(a) because it was impossible to determine the 
size of the lease offerings. 195 The Watt court, referring to the language 
of the OCSLAA, found that the plain words of the statute merely re­
quired that the size known at the program stage be given as precisely 
as possible. 196 There was nothing in the OCSLAA to limit the size of 
lease offerings, so long as the size was identified to the best of the Sec­
retary's knowledge. 197 
Finally, the petitioners claimed that the Secretary's delegation to 
industry of the responsibility to designate the areas which will actually 
be leased violated the OCSLAA.198 This direct challenge to the area­
wide leasing concept was also unsuccessful.I99 The court reasoned 
that the OCSLAA, a pyramidic statute, was designed to elicit input 
from all parties having an interest in OCS development.2OO The Call 
for Information, which invites comments from states, local govern­
ments, and concerned citizens, as well as from industry, was an exam­
ple of such participation.201 With the Watt court's rejection of these 
arguments, the areawide leasing concept received judicial approval. 202 
190. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 591-93 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
191. Id. at 592. 
192. 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
193. Id. at 592. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 592-93. 
197. Id. at 592. 




202. Vass I, supra note 35, at 77. 
The decision in California v. Watt was not the first time the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia had reviewed a section 18(a) challenge to the designation of a broad 
geographical area for lease sale planning. In 1981, a group challenged Secretary of the 
Interior Cecil Andrus's five-year program for the sale ofOCS oil and gas leases. California 
v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs argued that the designation of "Califor­
nia" as the area for proposed lease sales 73 and 80 violated the specificity requirement of 
section 18(a) of the OCSLAA. Id. at 1303. The plaintiffs argued, and Secretary Andrus 
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2. The quality of environmental assessments 
Under areawide leasing, an areawide environmental impact state­
ment (EIS) is prepared for the first sale in a planning area to assess the 
effects of all oil and gas activity that might occur there. The EIS ex­
amines the environment of the entire planning area and considers the 
nonpetroleum-related activities which may be endangered by offshore 
oil and gas activities. The EIS identifies alternatives to the proposed 
development, including the deletion of environmentally sensitive areas 
and the development of mitigating measures.203 It emphasizes the ag­
gregate impact of OCS oil and gas activity that would occur if all the 
hydrocarbon resources in the planning area were developed. The EIS 
assesses the expected cumulative effects that the DOl believes will oc­
cur from the initial sale under study. Under the areawide EIS con­
cept, the DOl has an early start on the environmental analysis since it 
does not have to wait for the identification of specific tracts as was 
previously necessary.204 
The EIS prepared for subsequent offerings in a planning area up­
dates the initial areawide EIS. This concept is called "tiering. "205 The 
update includes the results of ongoing environmental studies and mon­
conceded, that it would have been possible to designate with more precision the area of 
offshore California in which the sales would occur. Id. at 1303-04. The court held that 
since the Secretary had the information necessary to designate the area for sale more pre­
cisely, the statute required him to do so. Id. at 1304. This 1981 holding can be reconciled 
with the holding in the 1983 Watt case on the basis that the areawide leasing process often 
does not enable the Secretary of the Interior to designate with precision the area in which 
lease sales will occur. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, 
the later case, taken as a whole, is considerably more deferential to the Secretary of the 
Interior and substantially reduced the role ofjudicial review with respect to offshore oil and 
gas lease sales. See Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-State 
Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETfE L. REV. 83, 122 (1984) [hereinafter 
The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited]; Kelly, Court Ruling Supports OCS Leasing Plan, OFF­
SHORE, Oct. 1983, at 56-57. 
203. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 17-18. See also Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part I, supra note 12, at 33-34 (state­
ment of John Fields, Acting Manager, Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of 
Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
204. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part I, supra note 12, at 34 (statement of John 
Fields, Acting Manager, Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land Manage­
ment, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
205. Tiering involves sequential preparation of environmental impact statements 
from a broad, programmatic to a lesser or site-specific scope. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1989). 
For a discussion on the tiering of impact statements prepared on OCS lease sales, see Com­
ment, The Tiering ofImpact Statements-Can the Process be Stopped Halfway?, 20 URB. L. 
ANN. 197 (1980). For a case holding that site-specific reports are unnecessary where the 
DOl has been reasonably diligent in preparing broader impact statements, see Get Oil Out, 
Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See also supra notes 83-85 and accompa­
nying text. 
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itoring projects as well as information from any new exploration activ­
ities. Each subsequent EIS is shorter and takes less time to prepare 
than the initial areawide EIS.206 The DOl believes this change com­
plies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations 
which encourage agencies to tier their environmental impact state­
ments to eliminate repetitive discussions and analysis,z07 
Critics of areawide leasing assert that performing a meaningful 
environmental analysis for areawide sales is not possible.20s First, the 
large size of the planning area makes detailed environmental analysis 
impractical.209 The largest area previously analyzed under the tract 
selection system in an OCS EIS was 3.4 million acres.210 Second, the 
DOl is unable to delete particularly sensitive tracts, because tract-spe­
cific information is not available. General information for entire plan­
ning areas does not assist in determining the need for tract-specific 
lease stipulations. 2I I Third, the areawide EIS procedures place an in­
creased burden on special interest groups to gather information for 
tract deletions and lease stipulations. This responsibility belongs to 
the DOl as trustee for the public lands.212 Fourth, performing envi­
ronmental analysis on OCS areas where there is little chance of discov­
206. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales--Part 1, supra note 12, at 34. 
207. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 3, supra note 88, at 27; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 
(1989). 
208. Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's Five­
Year Leasing Plan-Part 2: Hearings on the Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the 
Department ofthe Interior's Five- Year Leasing Plan Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d 
Sess. 247-48 (1981-82) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Lease Sales--Part 2] (statement of 
Frances Beinecke, Senior Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
and Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hear­
ings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102-03 (statement of Sarah Chasis, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Leasing 
Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 132 (statement of Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol 
Bay Coastal Resource Servo Area Bd.). 
209. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
210. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 7 n.21. 
211. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings 
on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 254 (statement of Frances Beinecke, Senior 
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Sarah Chasis, Senior 
Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
212. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 257-58 (statement of 
Frances Beinecke, Senior Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
and Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
42 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
ering oil is a pointless effort and a waste of government resources. 213 
It costs the DOl approximately $5 million to produce an EIS for an 
OCS lease sale.214 Finally, the reductions in the level of funding for 
coastal management programs mean that financial resources will not 
be available to adequately assess the environmental impacts of area­
wide leasing.2ls 
The DOl stresses that prelease and postlease environmental regu­
lations and state and local consultation are the same under areawide 
leasing as under the tract nomination system. The steps and proce­
dures required by NEPA to assess environmental impacts from OCS 
leasing are being followed. 216 The industry believes that environmen­
tal assessments under areawide leasing are better. Consideration of 
larger areas may lead to a broader knowledge of geohazards, marine 
biology, physical oceanography, and environmental baselines. Area­
wide EISs recognize that most environmental studies are regional in 
scope rather than site specific.217 
Despite the critics' claims, the areawide leasing concept does not 
prevent the preparation of meaningful environmental analysis for lease 
sales. Representatives of industry, coastal states and national environ­
mental and fishery groups expressed little concern about the quality of 
DOl's environmental assessments in a questionnaire sent by the Gen­
eral Accounting Office. The questionnaire invited comments from 
concerned groups about DOl's planning documents. The majority of 
these groups believed that the documents are complete and contain 
accurate information.2ls Although DOl reduced the time for public 
comment, most of these groups believe that they still have an adequate 
213. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
214. Hearings on DeS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 5. Between 1970 and 
1984, the preparation of EIS's on the oil and gas leasing program cost the 001 approxi­
mately $60 million. The actual cost is considerably higher. The figure cited only includes 
staff salaries and printing costs and does not take into account money spent for environ­
mental studies, hearings, and meetings for the sales. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process­
Part J, supra note 98, at 86. 
215. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 132 (statement of 
Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol Bay Coastal Resource Servo Area Bd.). 
216. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 2-3. 
217. Hearings on DeS, supra note 99, at 264. 
218. EARLYASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 46. The GAO sent questionnaires to 128 oil and gas companies, 23 coastal states, and 78 
national environmental and fishery groups, inviting their comments on DOl's planning 
process. Jd. at vii-viii. Of those states that responded, 52% stated that DOl's planning 
documents were accurate and complete. Id. at 47. Only 22% of responding environmental 
and fishery groups stated that one or more planning documents were incomplete. Jd. at 48. 
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opportunity to participate.219 
E. Fair Market Value 
Section 18(a)( 4) of the OCSLAA requires the Secretary of the In­
terior to prepare and maintain a five-year OCS leasing program that 
will assure the federal government receipt of fair market value for 
leased tracts. 220 Areawide leasing floods the marketplace with large 
lease offerings and changes the bid acceptance procedures formerly 
used to determine fair market value.221 Controversy has resulted from 
the fact that the average bonus bid per acre has declined under the 
areawide system and that fair market value may not be received for 
leases under areawide offerings. 222 
The OCSLAA leasing program is based on the premise that com­
petition will provide a fair market value for the OCS tracts that are 
leased.223 The level of competition in the lease market may be assessed 
in terms of the number of participating companies, the percentage of 
Similarly, of the 105 companies responding to the questionnaire, only two stated that one 
or more planning documents were incomplete. Id. at 48. 
219. Id. at 48. The DOl reduced the minimum comment time to respond to its Call 
for Information from 60 to 30 days. Of the states which commented, 81 % stated that they 
had adequate time to respond. Id. at 49. However, only 16% of responding environmental 
and fishery groups believed that the time allowed to respond to the Call for Information is 
adequate. Id. There was no concern expressed by industry with the adequacy of the time 
allowed for the Call for Information. Id. Similarly, the majority of affected states and 
companies which responded stated that they had adequate time to comment on DOl's draft 
EIS's, when time was reduced below the traditional 60 day comment period, but only 36% 
of responding environmental groups said that the time was adequate. Id. 
220. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982). 
221. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 50. 
222. Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 27. See also 
Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of Sarah 
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
The Interior Department has traditionally leased OCS lands for oil and gas develop­
ment under a bonus bid, fixed royalty rate bidding system. Under this system, companies 
submit cash bids, commonly called bonuses, for the right to explore and develop OCS 
tracts. These bonuses are paid before exploration and are not refundable, regardless of 
whether any oil or gas is eventually produced. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 132, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1538. 
223. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 
EMD-77-19, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE No. 35­
PROBLEMS SELECTING AND EVALUATING LAND TO LEASE 30 (1977) [hereinafter OCS 
SALE 35]. For discussions on leasing federal mineral resources, see generally SMILEY, 
COMPETITIVE BIDDING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, THE CASE OF OFFSHORE OIL (1979); 
McDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION (1979); 
Gilley & Karels, The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence, 12 BELL J. EcON. 
637 (1981); Gilley, Karels & Lyon, The Economics ofOil Lease Bidding, 18 Hous. L. REV. 
1061 (1980-81); Logue, Sweeney & Willett, Optimal Leasing Policy for the Development of 
44 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
tracts receiving bids, the average number of bids per tract, and the 
average dollar amount bid per acre.224 Although the first two items 
have not proven to be a problem in areawide leasing,225 the average 
number of bids per tract and the average dollar amount bid per acre 
have decreased with the implementation of areawide leasing.226 
1. Increased Offerings-Flooding the Market? 
The Comptroller General has repeatedly concluded that competi­
tion is inadequate to assure receipt of fair market value when 49% or 
more of the tracts receiving bids obtain only one or two bids.227 Area­
wide leasing, with its expanded lease offerings, has increased the 
number of tracts receiving single bids. The number of bids per tract 
has declined from an average of 2.4 bids for each tract in tract nomina­
tion sales to 1.7 bids for each tract in areawide sales. 228 The DOl 
cancelled OCS Sale No. 82 in September 1984 when no industry bids 
were received.229 The large number of tracts receiving only one or two 
bids230 is an indication that sufficient competition may not exist for the 
government to receive fair market prices for much of the OCS acreage 
Outer Continental ShelfHydrocarbon Resources, 51 LAND EcON. 191 (1975); Reece, Com­
petitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9 BELL J. ECON. 369 (1978). 
224. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.· GAO/RCED-83-9, OFF­
SHORE LEASE SALE 59 AFFECTED BY DIFFERING VIEWS ON OIL AND GAS POTENTIAL 4 
(1983) [hereinafter OCS SALE 59]. 
225. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 19, 22-24; Hagar, supra note 99, at 41. 
226. See Crow, Dispute Over Area-wide Leasing Central to Oil Industry Access to 
OCS Acreage, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 41-46. 
. 227. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 
EMD-77-51, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE 4O-INAD­
EQUATE DATA USED TO SELECT AND EVALUATE LANDS TO LEASE 27 (1977) [hereinafter 
OCS SALE 40]; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. 
No. EMD-79-22, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: GEORGIA EMBAYMENT-ILLUSTRATING 
AGAIN THE NEED FOR MORE DATA BEFORE SELECTING AND LEASING OUTER CONTI· 
NENTAL SHELF LANDS 10 (1979). 
228. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18-19. 
229. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMIT­
TEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PUB. No. 
GAO/RCED-83-9, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALE 82-SALE PREPARATION 
AND SUBSEQUENT CANCELLATION 1 (1985) [hereinafter OCS SALE 82]. Critics of area­
wide leasing point to the cancellation of Sale 82 as an example that the areawide leasing 
system is not working. Crow, supra note 226, at 43. Industry, however, stated that the 
main reason why companies did not bid was because of poor potential for oil and gas 
discoveries in the North Atlantic. OCS SALE 82, supra, at 4-6. 
230. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 20. 
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leased.231 The DOl itself has recognized that areawide leasing will 
result in more tracts receiving fewer bids: 
It is likely that substantially expanded leasing will result in lower 
bids on average and perhaps lower bids for some tracts than they 
would bring under a more restrictive leasing program. . . . Ex­
panded lease offerings are also likely to result in more tracts receiv­
ing only 1 or 2 bids and perhaps even in fewer bids on the better 
prospects.232 
Even oil industry commentators acknowledged that the average 
number of bids per tract would decrease in areawide leasing.233 
However, both DOl and industry maintain that competition for 
OCS oil and gas leases is much greater than indicated by the average 
number of bids received per tract.234 Ofthe tracts offered in lease sales 
from 1954-76,39% received only one bid, but these tracts yielded only 
10% of total bonus value and accounted for only 17% of the total 
value of production. Similarly, 19% of the tracts received two bids 
and produced 8% of the total bonus value. These slightly improved 
prospects provided about 16% of the total value of production. The 
remaining 42% of tracts offered received three or more bids and gen­
erated 82% of the bonus value. The total value of production for these 
better prospects was a disproportionately high 64%.235 This finding 
indicates that although many tracts have been leased with only one or 
two bids, these low competition leases were of marginal economic 
value. Conversely, most of the production came from tracts that had 
strong competition and generated high bonuses. Competition for 
leases is determined more by the hydrocarbon potential of the tract 
offered than the size of the lease sale.236 
A study for the state of Texas, however, concluded that the re­
duction in competition, defined as the number of bids per tract, was 
the direct result of areawide leasing and the oversupply of acreage of­
231. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 521 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
232. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 2 FINAL 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR 
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY 1982-DECEMBER 1986 859 
(undated). 
233. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 521 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
234. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 57. 
235. Id. at 56. 
236. 1d. 
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fered. 237 The General Accounting Office also found that the change 
from the tract selection process to areawide leasing has reduced the 
number of bids received for individual tracts. Furthermore, the GAO 
results indicated that the number of bids received per tract signifi­
cantly affected the amount of the high bid per acre received by the 
federal government. On average, each additional bid per acre is asso­
ciated with about a $1,082 increase in the amount of the high bid re­
ceived for each acre of OCS land.238 
Another point of debate is whether the areawide concept should 
be abandoned because the average bonus bid per acre has declined by 
about 75% since the beginning of areawide leasing.239 The average bid 
per acre for lease sales from November 30, 1979 to September 30, 1984 
decreased from $2,624 per acre in tract nomination sales to $686 per 
acre in areawide sales.240 By OCS region, the average bid per acre 
leased declined from $1,793 to $664 in Alaska, from $1,619 to $299 in 
the Atlantic, from $3,099 to $702 in the Gulf of Mexico, and from 
$4,628 to $366 in the Pacific.241 
In response to these figures, the DOl and industry maintain that 
areawide leasing is not responsible for the decline in the average bid 
per acre. There are good reasons for industry to offer less than it once 
did per OCS acre, regardless of the type of leasing system used. These 
reasons include: the failure of industry to find oil and gas in highly 
promising areas of the Atlantic and Alaska regions; the inferior qual­
ity of the remaining offerings; and the location of many of the tracts in 
deepwater and frontier areas where operating costs are high.242 In ad­
237. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 21. 
238. Id. at 22. 
239. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 75, 122 (statement 
of Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United 
States, Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Important oes Issue 
Hung Up on Minor Point: Bids Per Acre, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 39. See also Lack 
of Bids for Whale Pasture Doesn't Invalidate Area- Wide Leasing, Oil & Gas J., Oct. 22, 
1984, at 55; To Boost oes Bidding, Extend Termsfor Leases in Deep Water, Oil & Gas J., 
July 16, 1984, at 23; Decline in Bids per oesAcre No Reason to Scrap Area-Wide Sales, Oil 
& Gas J., May 7, 1984, at 71; Low Bids May Cause Revision ofArea-Wide oes Sales, Oil & 
Gas J., Apr. 30, 1984, at 40. 
240. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 22. See also Hearing on the Five-Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 27; Hear­
ings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of Sarah Chasis, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
241. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 22. 
242. Important oes Issue Hung Up on Minor Point: Bids Per Acre, supra note 239, 
at 39; Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 75, 122 (statement of 
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dition, areawide sales have included a combination of high-value and 
low-value tracts,. with the result that the average bid would logically 
be lower than bids received in tract nomination sales.243 Industry also 
asserts that the critics of areawide leasing focus too much attention on 
the up-front bonus which companies pay the federal government for 
an OCS lease. The United States will receive more money from the 
expedited production of OCS reserves and the revenues it generates in 
royalties and taxes than from the up-front bonuses. The royalty and 
tax increases will more than offset the decline in bonuses per acre.244 
Finally, the DOl and industry maintain that the decline in bid per 
acre is primarily the result of the drop in the price of oil. While the 
depressed world oil market is in part responsible for low lease bids, the 
decline greatly exceeds the degree to which the international price of 
oil has fallen. In 1985, the bid levels in some sales dropped 90% from 
their high levels of just a few years ago, while the world price of oil has 
declined about 12% since reaching its high in 1981.245 
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the decline in bonuses per 
acre will be offset by earlier receipt of royalties, rents and taxes or by 
increased production. As of the end of fiscal year 1984, bonuses had 
comprised about 67% of the total direct revenues received by the fed­
eral government since OCS leasing began in 1954. Royalties and rents 
accounted for most of the remaining 33% of direct revenues. 246 
2. DOl's New Process for Evaluating Industry Bids 
In addition to flooding the marketplace with lease offerings, the 
accelerated OCS program changed the evaluation procedure that the 
DOl had used in the past to determine whether the bids received con­
stituted fair market value. Under the traditional procedure, economic, 
geological, and engineering data on the sale area were gathered before 
each sale. A detailed economic evaluation was prepared from this in-
Dan Chappell, Diy. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Hearings on OCS Five- Year Pro­
gram, supra note 99, at 205-09. 
243. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 122 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Diy. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
244. Hearings on OCS Five-Year Program, supra note 99, at 203. See also Hagar, 
supra note 99, at 40. 
245. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 413 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, 
Oceans, Coast, and Public Lands Project, on behalf of the Enytl. Policy Inst.). 
246. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 24, 26. 
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formation for every tract offered for lease,247 and a minimum accepta­
ble bid for each tract was determined prior to the sale. After the sale, 
industry bids were compared with the presale tract evaluations, and 
only those bids meeting or exceeding the DOl's assigned values could 
be accepted. 248 
This detailed analysis slowed leasing of OCS tracts. Recognizing 
that it would be impossible to perform a detailed analysis on every 
tract offered under the areawide concept, the DOl changed the tract 
evaluation procedure. Under the new evaluation procedure, tracts are 
no longer evaluated before a sale. Instead, bids are analyzed after they 
are received by a two-phase evaluative process that relies more heavily 
on the marketplace to determine fair market value.249 Because the 
OCSLAA does not explicitly define fair market value, the DOl 
adopted the common law definition. Common law defines fair market 
value as the price that a knowledgeable and willing seller would accept 
from a knowledgeable and willing but not obligated buyer.25o 
In phase one of the new process, the tracts receiving bids are sep­
arated into three categories. These categories include: (1) tracts re­
ceiving nonprospective bids; (2) tracts where opportunities for 
strategic underbidding, information asymmetry,251 collusion, and 
other noncompetitive practices might occur, and where the govern­
ment has the most detailed and reliable data; and (3) tracts where 
competitive market forces can be relied upon to assure fair market 
value.252 Within these categories, high bids on all tracts classified as 
drainage and development tracts253 are referred directly to phase two 
for further evaluation. All legal high bids on non prospective tracts are 
247. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 522-23 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
248. OCS SALE 59, supra note 224, at 10. 
249. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 28-30. 
250. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR 
OCS BID ADEQUACY, INCLUDING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE OCS FAIR MARKET 
VALUE TASK FORCE at i (1983) [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY). See 
also California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983); EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's 
AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 30-32; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY 
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 52; OCS SALE 59, supra note 
224, at 10-11; oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces, supra note 79; Reagan Energy 
Policy Plan Tied to Free Market, supra note 79; Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, 
supra note 98, at 75. 
251. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 52. Nonprospective tracts are those in which oil and gas probably do not exist, or 
from which oil and gas are not economically recoverable. Id. at 52 n.146. 
252. Id. at 52. 
253. Id. "Development and drainage tracts are located near tracts with proven pro­
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accepted. After anomalously low bids have been screened out, high 
bids are accepted for any prospective tract that received three or more 
bids, that received more than the average number of bids on prospec­
tive tracts in the entire sale, or for which the geometric average bonus 
bid254 for the tract is in the upper 50th percentile for those prospective 
tracts receiving bids.255 
All bids which are not accepted under the phase one criteria un­
dergo a more detailed analysis in phase two. This analysis is the same 
as that performed on all tracts under the old procedure. The DOl 
estimates that approximately 55% of the bids on prospective tracts are 
accepted in phase one of the new evaluation procedure.256 
This new procedure facilitates accelerated leasing which in turn 
results in a short-term increase in annual revenues to the federal gov­
ernment. This increase, however, may be offset by future long-term 
losses to the Treasury.257 The Sierra Club has calculated that the fed­
eral government will lose approximately $76.89 billion in OCS lease 
revenues if all the remaining oil and gas reserves are leased under the 
procedure developed for the areawide OCS program.258 The depres­
sion of bid levels below fair market value will result in a loss of $53.5 
duction." They are given more detailed analysis because holders of nearby tract leases may 
possess more information than other bidders. Id. at 52 n.148. 
254. Id. at 52. A geometric average bonus bid is the mean of all bids on a tract. Id. 
at 52 n.149. 
255. Id. at 52. For an overview of tract bid evaluation procedures, see PROCEDURES 
FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY, supra note 250; Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, 
supra note 98, at 75-76; EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, 
supra note 96, at 92-100. 
256. PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY, supra note 250, at 5. 
257. EARLY AssESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18. For discussions on revenue losses from leasing OCS lands, see generally Grayson, 
Canaday, Brumbaugh, Sherman & Sutherland, Issues of Competition on the Outer Conti­
nental Shelf, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 69 (1983); Mead, Moesidjord & Sorensen, Com­
petition in Outer Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Auctions: A Statistical Analysis of Winning Bids, 
26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 95 (1986); Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State Reve­
nue Losses From Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 EcOLOGY L.Q. 481 (1985). 
Areawide leasing is not the only reason why the federal government is losing revenues 
from public lands. The deficiencies in DOl's oil and gas royalty collections have resulted in 
losses of millions of dollars owed to the United States from industry lessees. COMPTROL­
LER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, OIL AND GAS ROYALTY COLLECTIONS-SERIOUS FINANCIAL MAN­
AGEMENT PROBLEMS NEED CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION (1979); GENERAL ACCOUNT­
ING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, INTERIOR'S MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS NEED CONSOLIDATION TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
CONTROL (1982). 
258. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 46, at 14; Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, 
supra note 208, at 532 (statement of Carl Pope, Assistant Conservation Director, Sierra 
Club), and at 580-83 (DOl's response); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR 
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billion over time.259 According to the Sierra Club's calculations, the 
new bid evaluation procedure will cost taxpayers an additional $23.4 
billion.260 Even the DOl calculated that the areawide concept could 
cost the public $5 billion in lost revenues through 1987.261 
According to some sources, these projected losses are now being 
verified. In a statistical analysis for the first ten areawide sales be­
tween April 1983 and September 1984, the GAO indicated that chang­
ing to the areawide program resulted in an average reduction in bids of 
$541 per acre leased, or $3.1 million for each tract leased.262 
Although the federal government received $8.9 billion in total bids, 
the GAO analysis concluded that this amount was about $7 billion (a 
discounted value of $5.4 billion) less than the United States would 
have received if the slower pace of the prior tract nomination program 
had been followed. 263 The areawide system and massive dumping of 
leases on the market have driven down the value of state offshore 
leases as well, resulting in lost revenue to coastal states.264 
Another major area of economic concern was the cost-benefit 
analysis underlying the accelerated scheduling of sales. In formulating 
the timing of individual lease sales, the DOl considered only the value 
of expected petroleum resources in 1982, giving no consideration to 
the change in value of those resources over time: 
In essence, [the Department of the Interior's] approach to leasing is 
to immediately dispose of any of those resources which have any 
value at all. . . . This methodology ignores the obvious fact-that 
OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 55-60; OCS Lease Plan Seen Costing u.s. $77.28 
Billion, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 114. 
259. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 46, at 8. 
260. Id. at 12. 
261. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 522-23 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
262. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18, 22-24, See also Peterson, Billions Seen Lost in Offshore Leasing: GAO Says Watt 
Scheme Cut Competition, Washington Post, July 30, 1985, at AI7, col. I. The DOl and 
industry strongly disagreed with GAO's conclusions, maintaining that the decrease in OCS 
revenues was largely the result of the decline in oil prices and quality of tracts offered, 
including deepwater offerings. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT 
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE 
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS, 
VIEWS ON INTERIOR'S COMMENTS TO GAO REPORTS ON LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS 
(1986). 
263. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18. Because it would have taken the DOl longer to lease the same amount ofOCS lands 
under the tract nomination system, the $7 billion loss was discounted 6.5% in 1984 dollars 
to reflect the time value of money. [d. at 24. 
264. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 257-58. 
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any rational owner of resources would recognize-that delaying the 
disposition of resources until sometime in the future is economically 
preferable if the value is expected to rise sufficiently in the 
interim.265 
In calculating the costs and benefits of delaying lease sales, the 
DOl assumed a 1 % annual real price increase. This projected low rate 
of increase significantly underestimated the benefits of delaying certain 
lease sales, including those in Alaska. 266 
The areawide leasing concept has decreased competition in the 
lease market;267 nevertheless, the DOl is placing increased reliance on 
that market to assure receipt of fair market value for the disposal of 
publicly owned resources.268 In fact, large acreage offerings and in­
creased sale frequency have reduced competition and bid revenues for 
individual tracts.269 The possible effects of Secretary Watt's acceler­
ated leasing plan can be inferred from the results of a previous attempt 
in 1973 to accelerate OCS leasing. In that instance, competition de­
clined as the acreage offered increased. The Watt accelerated leasing 
program, like the one in 1973, has significantly reduced competition 
for OCS tracts.270 Furthermore, the introduction of areawide leasing 
occurred at a time when the market for petroleum products was soft. 
The worldwide glut of oil and gas depresses the demand for OCS 
leases and reduces the return the public receives for these resources. 271 
Coastal states do not receive funds directly from federal OCS 
lease activity.272 Nonetheless, states benefit indirectly when public re­
sources are sold for their true value.273 Selling public resources at a 
lower price is inconsistent with a national fiscal policy devoted to bal­
ancing the budget and lowering taxes.274 Indeed, Secretary Watt's ac­
265. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 527 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
266. Id. at 528. The one percent figure was taken from the low growth range predic­
tion of a study done by the Resource Consulting Group (RCG). The RCG determined that 
the most likely growth rate was 2.5 to 3.5% per year. Id. at 528-29. The Department of 
Energy predicted a 3% growth rate. Id. At a 3% rate, it was beneficial to delay leasing in 
six lease areas of offshore Alaska that have sensitive resources. Id. at 529 n.1. 
267. EARLY AssESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18. 
268. Id. at 1-2. 
269. Id. at 18. 

. 270. NAT'L OCEAN POL'y STUD., supra note 156, at 4-5, 17-25. 

271. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year oes Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 8 (state­
ment of Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio). 
272. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1496. 
273. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 258. 
274. Id.; oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 277. 
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celerated areawide leasing program has been characterized as "the 
most monumental giveaway in the Nation's history."275 
3. 	 Compliance with OCSLAA's Fair Market Value 
Requirement 
Just as the issue of compliance with section 18(a) of the OCSLAA 
was raised,276 the issue of receipt of fair market value for OCSLAA 
resources was raised in a court challenge to Secretary Watt's areawide 
leasing plan. In California v. Watt,277 the petitioners challenged the 
Secretary's program, claiming that it failed to assure receipt of fair 
market value for offshore resources. They argued that areawide leas­
ing and the accelerated rate of leasing combined to depress the value 
of bonus bids. Consequently, they argued that the federal government 
was not receiving the fair market value of the lands leased as required 
by the OCSLAA.278 
The court found that even if the petitioners' claims were correct, 
it would not mean that the Secretary had violated the OCSLAA. The 
court upheld the areawide leasing program, noting that the OCSLAA 
does not require a maximization of revenues, only the receipt of a fair 
return for federal leases.279 Secretary Watt had determined that the 
supply and demand conditions existing at the time of the lease sale, 
along with a process of competitive sealed bidding and the bid evalua­
tion process, would be sufficient to ensure a fair return.280 The court 
held that the Secretary's reliance on these factors was a reasonable 
means of ensuring receipt of fair market value for OCS lands and com­
plied with the OCSLAA.281 
The Watt court's decision was incorrect.282 Although the 
275. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year DCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 9 (state­
ment of Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio). 
276. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text. 
277. 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
278. Id. at 606. For a discussion on the receipt of fair market value in the Watt 
litigation, see Fitzgerald, California v. Watt: Congressional Intent Bows to Judicial Re­
straint, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 194-97 (19~7). 
279. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d at 606. 
280. Id. at 606-08. 
281. Id. at 608. 
282. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981). See also 
Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 751, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he appro­
priate standard appears to be that leases must insure a 'fair and equitable return.' "). For 
discussion of these cases, see Comment, Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation: 
Secretarial Discretion to Select Lease Bidding Systems, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 163 
(1983). 
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OCSLAA does not explicitly define fair market value,283 the Act re­
quires the Secretary to conduct the OCS leasing program in order "to 
assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the rights 
conveyed by the Federal Government."284 One of the stated purposes 
of the OCSLAA was "to preserve and maintain free enterprise compe­
tition. "285 The Secretary is charged with the duties of a trustee over 
the public lands. An important responsibility of the Secretary as 
trustee is to insure "that the public interest is served by exacting a fair . 
return on behalf of the government from the persons engaged in ex­
ploiting its resources."286 
The California v. Watt decision fails to account for the new em­
phasis on receipt of fair market value in the OCSLAA.287 The 1953 
version of the OCSLA did not mention fair market value. It provided 
that in order to meet urgent need for further exploration and develop­
ment of the oil and gas resources of the OCS, "the Secretary is author­
ized to grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder or bidders by 
competitive bidding ... oil and gas lease[s] [on the OCS]."288 The 
1978 amendments added the fair market value requirement and 
changed the Act's emphasis, adding the fair market value requirement 
as a congressional purpose on an equal footing with those of energy 
development and environmental protection.289 In addition to the gen­
eral fair market value requirement of the OCSLAA, other sections of 
the Act also support a strict interpretation of fair market value. For 
example, among the congressional findings is a statement that "the 
Outer Continental Shelf contains significant quantities of oil and natu­
ral gas and is a vital national resource reserve which must be carefully 
managed so as to realize fair value, to preserve and maintain competi­
tion, and to reflect the public interest."29o The legislative history of 
the OCSLAA emphasizes the congressional intent to assure the receipt 
of fair market value for leasing OCS lands. The House report accom­
panying the 1978 amendments states: "[L]easing activities, including 
the scheduling of lease sales and the amount to be included in the lease 
sales, should assure receipt to the Government of fair market value for 
283. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 30. 
284. 43 U.S.c. § 1344(a)(4) (1982). 
285. Id. § 1802(2)(D). 
286. Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1971). 
287. See Note, Sales of Federal Fuel Resources: AchieVing "Fair Market Value", 9 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 237, 253-54, 257 (1984). 
288. 43 U.S.c. § 1337(a)(I) (1982). 
289. Id. § 1344(a)(4) (1982). 
290. Id. § 1801(7). 
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our public resources."291 Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that Congress, in passing the OCSLAA, "com­
mitted the Government to the goal of obtaining fair market value for 
OCS oil and gas resources. The 1978 Amendments themselves pro­
claim this intention, and the legislative history is replete with refer­
ences to this purpose."292 The Watt court ignored the clear 
congressional intent to emphasize the receipt of fair market value for 
leasing OCS lands and incorrectly upheld implementation of Secretary 
Watt's areawide leasing concept. 
Although fair market value is one of the most difficult concepts to 
define in federal res~urce leasing policy, the federal government 
should not offer to lease so much acreage that an already depressed 
market will be flooded. 293 Areawide leasing and an accelerated leasing 
schedule have jeopardized the assurance that the government will re­
ceive a fair market value return on leases of OCS lands.294 Some DOl 
officials argue that overestimating the value of OCS resources is ulti­
mately more costly than underestimating resource values because 
overestimating the value of OCS lands may result in acreage not being 
leased and developed, since the high bid is less than the government 
estimate. These officials argue that receipt of fair market value is sec­
ondary to the national policy of developing offshore resources.295 The 
argument fails to note that OCS lands are public resources and that it 
is the government's responsibility to assure that they are not leased to 
industry for less than what they are worth.296 It also ignores the 
291. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 149, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1555. 
292. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. lSI, 162 (1981). 
293. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 411 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, 
Oceans, Coast and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). Secretary Watt was also 
criticized for leasing coal reserves without receiving fair market value. On April 28, 1982, 
the 001 held the largest federal coal lease sale in the nation's history. It offered about 1.6 
billion tons of coal reserves in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana. The sale 
results were controversial. DOl's offer to lease so much coal in a depressed market raised 
questions as to whether a fair return was received for coal leases. See COMPTROLLER GEN­
ERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-83-119, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS, ANALYSIS OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN FEDERAL COAL LEASE SALE: 
ECONOMIC VALUATION IMPROVEMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED 1 (1983). 
GAO found that the amount received from the leases was about $100,000,000 less than 
estimates of fair market value. Id. at 25. 
294. OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 1; EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA­
WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 18. 
295. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, PUB. No. RED-75-359, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOP­
MENT-IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN DETERMINING WHERE TO LEASE AND AT WHAT 
DOLLAR VALUE 16-17 (1975). 
296. Id. 
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OCSLAA mandate to emphasize the receipt of fair market value in 
leasing OCS lands as coequal with development and environmental 
protection.297 
III. CONGRESSIONAL LEASING MORATORIA 
The Reagan administration's continued support for the areawide 
leasing concept and its refusal to delete areas of environmental sensi­
tivity and economic importance from lease sales was perceived by 
coastal states and environmental groups as a resource program 
weighted heavily toward energy production, irrespective of legitimate 
state concerns for balanced OCS development. 298 The administra­
tion's opposition to continued funding for state coastal management 
programs, OCS revenue sharing, and consistency requirements led 
states and local citizens to conclude that they were taking all the risks 
of OCS activity but receiving none of the benefits in return. 299 These 
factors, combined with pressure from the Department of Defense for 
deletions of tracts for military uses300 and growing concern over the 
receipt of fair market value, prompted Congress to impose leasing 
moratoria on areas of the OCS.301 
The total area in all moratoria enacted in the various appropria­
tions acts from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1989 has increased 
297. 43 u.s.c. § 1344(a)(4) (1982). 
298. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 2-3; Hearings on OCS, 
supra note 99, at 399 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources 
Defense Council); Offshore Oil and Gas Oversight: Hearings on Moratoria on Offshore Oil 
and Gas Leases Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the 
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 118-24 (1984) [here­
inafter Hearings on OCS Moratoria] (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, 
Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
299. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 399 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project 
Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra 
note 298, at 24. See supra notes 159-81 and accompanying text. 
300. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 48-56, 292-96; Hearings on OCS, 
supra note 99, at 399-400 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Re­
sources Defense Council, Inc.). 
301. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 399-400 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior 
Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Moratoria, 
supra note 298, at 124-27 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and 
Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). Leasing moratoria have been enacted by placing 
restrictions on the annual Interior appropriation acts on spending funds for the purpose of 
prelease preparation on holding certain lease sales. Department ofthe Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 1989-Part 6: Hearings of the Testimony of Public Witnesses 
Before the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House 
Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988) [hereinafter House Hearings on 
the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6]; Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, 
at 82 (statement of William Clark, Secretary of the Interior). 
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from 736,000 acres to 25.7 million acres annually, totalling approxi­
mately 181 million acres. Proposals are pending in Congress to extend 
the existing moratoria and add additional acres to those already re­
stricted.302 There are also proposals to prohibit leasing in some OCS 
areas along the coasts of California and Massachusetts until the year 
2000. 303 
A. The Rationale for Leasing Moratoria 
Coastal states, local governments, and environmental groups have 
supported the leasing moratoria304 claiming that the limitations were 
modest and focused on areas of great environmental sensitivity which 
the DOl was unwilling to protect.305 The moratorium areas have sig­
nificant environmental assets in fisheries, habitats for endangered 
marine species, and coastal-related tourism.306 Georges Bank, in the 
North Atlantic planning area, is one of the most productive fishing 
areas in the world, supporting over 40,000 jobs in New England and 
sustaining a fishing industry of over $1 billion annually. 307 Included 
302. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, !jupra note 102, at 82-83 (statement of Wil­
liam Clark, Secretary of the Interior). 
303. See Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 260 (statement of 
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, National Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa 
Speer, Resource Specialist, National Resources Defense Council, Inc.). See also Considera­
tion ofLegislation to Restrict the Department of the Interior's Oil and Gas Leasing Program 
on the Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings on HR. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Mining, 
Forest Management, and Bonneville Power Administration of the House Comm. on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-12 (1984); House Hearings on the 1989 DOl 
Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 239-42. 
304. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325 (statement of Representative Leon 
Panetta of California); Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 165-79 (statement of 
C. Deming Cowles, Washington Representative, United Fishermen of Alaska), at 211-25 
(statement of John Paul Jones, Vice President, Bering Sea Fisherman's Ass'n). The major­
ity of the California congressional delegation, including Senators, the state's Attorney Gen­
eral, and the majority of its coastal cities and counties have expressed their strong support 
for a continuation of the moratorium. Perhaps most important, in 1984, both bodies of the 
state legislature approved Joint Resolution 42, which calls for a five-year prohibition on 
OCS leasing of all California's moratorium areas. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325­
26 (statement of Representative Leon Panetta of California). 
305. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325-26 (statement of Representative Leon 
Panetta of California); Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-61 (state­
ment of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney and Lisa Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
306. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 326-27 (statement of Representative Leon 
Panetta of California); Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-60 (state­
ment of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney and Lisa Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
307. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-60 (statement of Sa­
rah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa Speer, 
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
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in the California moratorium is the pristine Big Sur coastline, as well 
as communities dependent on the state's $16 billion fishing and tour­
ism industries. 308 These industries would be severely damaged by 
chronic oil discharges, the visual pollution of offshore platforms, and 
most destructive of all, a major oil spill into the marine 
environment.309 
The impact on overall acreage made available to industry for 
lease and on petroleum production is claimed to be minimaJ.3 \0 The 
fiscal year 1984 prohibition represented approximately 8.5% ofthe es­
timated hydrocarbon resources which were scheduled to be offered in 
that year.311 Areas within the leasing moratoria in fiscal year 1986 
contained only 8% of the nation's overall OCS reserves and 5% of the 
total OCS acreage eligible for lease.312 Even with the moratoria in 
1986, more than 170 million OCS acres containing over 70% of the 
United States total estimated OCS hydrocarbon reserves were avail­
able for lease during that fiscal year alone.313 
Supporters of OCS leasing moratoria also claim that the prohibi­
tion does not threaten the nation's energy security, employment, or 
the economy in general. 314 Since the imposition of leasing moratoria 
in 1982, the economy has improved, unemployment has decreased, oil 
prices have fallen, and OCS leasing, drilling rig utilization, and pro­
duction have risen. 315 Since the amount of oil in the moratoria areas is 
so small--only 8% of total OCS estimated reserves-lifting the re­
striction would have a minimal impact on United States energy 
security.316 
Moreover, in spite of its rhetoric of national energy independence, 
the Reagan administration pursued policies which were fundamentally 
inconsistent with the drive for that goal. The administration's 1986 
308. [d. at 254-56; Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 326-27 (statement of Repre­
sentative Leon Panetta of California). 
309. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 327. See also id. at 393-402 (statement of 
Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
310. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 261 (statement of Sarah 
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa Speer, 
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
311. [d. at 251-52. 
312. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 400-01 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior 
Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
313. [d. at 328 (statement of Representative Leon Panetta of California). 
314. [d. at 401 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.). 
315. [d. 
316. [d.; Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 266-67 (statement of 
Elizabeth Raisbeck, Legislative Director, Friends of the Earth). 
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fiscal year budget proposals included discontinuing purchases for the 
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), the nation's first line of defense 
against disruptions in foreign petroleum supplies. The budget propo­
sal would have left the SPR more than 250 million barrels short of the 
650 million barrel goal established by Congress. The administration 
also proposed drastic budget cuts for programs which are vital to a 
comprehensive national energy independence strategy, including fossil 
fuel research, solar and renewable energy research, and energy 
conservation.3 17 
Furthermore, it was argued, a leasing moratorium would not 
harm the employment of minorities. In 1984, only 4.3% of those em­
ployed in the crude petroleum and natural gas extraction industry 
were black. However, in those industries most likely to be impacted 
by OCS activities-the fishing, hotel, and restaurant industries­
blacks account for 8.8%, 16.5% and 9.7% of the respective work 
forces. 318 The American steel industry has not been affected by the 
moratoria. A recent United States Trade Commission report stated 
that of ten contracts for offshore oil platforms put out for bid since 
1979, only one has been awarded to a domestic fabricator. 319 
Advocates of leasing moratoria, therefore, maintain that a careful 
balancing of resource potential against environmental risk weighs in 
favor of imposing moratoria on the environmentally sensitive and pro­
ductive areas of the United States' OCS.320 Supporters ofleasing mor­
atoria feel that such restrictions are necessary and will continue to be 
necessary until a more rational and balanced OCS program has been 
instituted.321 
B. The Drawbacks of Leasing Moratoria 
The Department of the Interior322 and the offshore oil and gas 
industry have objected to the imposition of congressional leasing mor­
atoria, claiming that these prohibitions undermine both the national 
317. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 329 (statement of Representative Leon 
Panetta of California). 
318. [d. at 336. 
319. Id. at 336-37. 
320. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 248-50 (statement of Lisa 
Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
321. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 330-33 (statement of Representative Leon 
E. Panetta of California); Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 115, 118 (state­
ment of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy 
Inst.). 
322. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car­
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
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security and economic well-being of the United States.323 Former Sec­
retary of the Interior Clark stated that the moratoria effectively re­
pealed the OCSLAA and that he "should consider closing MMS and 
spending [his] time among the other nine ... [DOl] bureaus!"324 The 
petroleum industry has negatively characterized the effect of the mora­
toria: "If a foreign power had managed to do to us what we have done 
to ourselves, to shape our energy policy so disastrously, we would call 
it an act of war."325 
The worst single effect of leasing moratoria has been the disrup­
tion of exploration continuity in OCS areas, adding additional delay to 
an already lengthy process.326 Developing a single OCS well can take 
as long as ten to fifteen years from the time of exploration activities to 
production.327 Uncertainty about whether particular areas will or will 
not be available for lease creates confusion and inefficiency in industry 
leasing decisions. Industry must invest millions of dollars to deter­
mine where to spend scarce capital bidding on a tract if it becomes 
available for lease; now the area may later be included in a leasing 
moratorium.328 Leasing moratoria prevent the DOl from determining 
the hydrocarbon potential of these areas; therefore, the energy policies 
of the United States are based on incomplete information.329 Explora­
323. Id. at 228 (statement of C.B. Wheeler, Senior Vice President, Exxon Co., 
U.S.A., representing Am. Petroleum Inst.). The petroleum industry has extensively edito­
rialized against the moratoria. See generally Fine Line Between Issues, Oil & Gas J., Apr. 
18, 1988, at 20; OCS: A Familiar Issue, Oil & Gas J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 28; Showdowns 
Loom on California OCS, Oil & Gas J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 27; Moratorium Sidestepped, Oil & 
Gas J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 23; Moratorium Renewed, Oil & Gas J., July 21, 1986, at 30; 
Williams, Environmental Objections Block Important West Coast Oil Work, Oil & Gas J., 
Apr. 21, 1986, at 17-22; Moratorium Loses, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 50; Groups Hit 
OCS Leasing Moratoriums, Oil & Gas J., Apr. I, 1985, at 66; Simultaneous Leasing Escapes 
Congressional Axe-This Time, Oil & Gas J., July 2, 1984, at 17; Moratoriums Seen Lock­
ing Up Big OCS Resource, Oil & Gas J., June 18, 1984, at 92; Concern Over Environment or 
Economic Obstructionism?, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 31; Congress Subverts its Own 
OCS Development Mandate by Denying Funds for Lease Sales, Oil & Gas J., Nov. 28, 1983, 
at 39. 
324. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 117. 
325. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra 
note 136, at 202 (statement of Robert E. Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Nat'l Supply Co.). The controversy over leasing moratoria has even involved senior citizen 
groups. The National Alliance of Senior Citizens opposed the prohibition, claiming that 
elderly consumers who live on fixed incomes cannot afford rising energy costs or energy 
shortages that may subject seniors to debilitating illnesses. Id. at 182-85. 
326. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 336 (statement of Atlantic 
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS). 
327. /d. at 180 (statement of Max G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Exploration, 
Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
328. Id. at 179-80. 
329. Hearings on OCS LeaSing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 120 (statement of 
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tion continuity is also necessary in order to pursue promising geologic 
basins. Although leasing moratoria have prohibited exploration in 
only a relatively small portion of the total United States OCS, it is the 
nearshore, shallow areas closed to exploration by moratoria that offer 
the greatest potential for discovering economically viable oil and gas 
reserves.330 
Some advocates of leasing moratoria claim that one-year delays 
have no significant effect on future energy production. However, 
when those prohibitions are extended and expanded annually, the de­
lay undermines this country's prospects for energy security. In addi­
tion, new oil and gas supplies will take longer to deliver to American 
consumers.331 If the areas prohibited in the fiscal year 1984 appropria­
tions act were to be permanently removed from leasing, approximately 
2.24 billion barrels of oil would be foregone. 332 This production could 
have replaced domestic oil and gas reserves which are rapidly being 
depleted. The proved oil and natural gas reserves of the United States 
have declined by 30% since 1970.333 More than 75% percent of the 
oil the nation will require in the year 2000 must still be discovered. By 
1994, the United States must find thirty-two billion barrels of domestic 
oil just to replace the oil the nation is depleting.334 To maintain the 
current level of domestic reserves and production, the United States 
will need to find nine million barrels of oil and fifty-five billion cubic 
feet of natural gas each day.335 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
330. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 336 (statement of Atlantic 
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS). 
331. Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 25; Hearings 
on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 120 (statement of Dan Chappell, Div. 
Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, Amoco Prod. Co., 
on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
332. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 8 (statement of Representative 
John Breaux of Louisiana). 
333. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 118 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). The rapid depletion of domestic 
reserves is illustrated by the fact that 68% of the oil and gas reserves in the Louisiana OCS 
are now depleted. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 194 (statement of 
Philip J. Burguieres, President & Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf 
of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
334. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 194 (statement of Philip J. 
Burguieres, President & Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf of the 
Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
335. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 118 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United ·States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
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If the United States is to avoid further declines in domestic pro­
duction, oil and gas exploration must be allowed in the most promis­
ing offshore areas.336 As much as half of this country's future oil and 
gas production is estimated to come from offshore areas. Nonetheless, 
the United States has leased and explored less of its OCS than most of 
the other major industrial nations of the world. Since federal OCS 
leasing began in 1954, only 4% of the OCS has b~en leased for oil and 
gas exploration, only 2% is currently under lease, and only 1 % is pro­
ducing oil or gas. 337 In contrast, since 1964, the United Kingdom has 
leased 66 million offshore acres, 41 % of its continental shelf. The 
United Kingdom is self-sufficient in oil production and currently ex­
ports petroleum to the United States. Canada has leased 900 million 
acres since 1964, nearly one-third of its 2.8 billion acre continental 
shelf.338 
In contrast to our allies, the United States now imposes leasing 
moratoria on promising OCS acreage while continuing to import more 
than one-third of the oil it uses. Imports accounted for more than 
42% of 1988 demand, a level that is higher than at the start of the 
1973-74 Arab oil embargo. It is estimated that imported oil could ac­
count for more than one-half of total United States demand by 1990 
and for more than two-thirds by the year 2000.339 Events in the Mid­
dle East, including the Iran-Iraq war, show how a sudden disruption 
to oil supplies could result due to trouble in the Persian Gulf area. 
Many of this country's allies and trading partners are dependent on 
Persian Gulf oil, and any sudden disruption would threaten United 
States oil and_allied economic and political well-being.340 Oil and nat­
336. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't o/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra 
note 136, at 204 (statement of Robert E. Harris, President & Chief Executive Officer of 
Nat'l Supply Co.). 
337. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 119 (statement of 
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, 
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
338. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 319 (statement of William C. 
O'Malley, President, Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., on behalf of Int'l Ass'n of Drilling 
Contractors). . 
339. Id. at 229 (statement of c.B. Wheeler, Senior Vice President for Exploration, 
Exxon Co., U.S.A., on behalf of Am. Petroleum Inst.); Department 0/ the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations/or 1989-Part 12: Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on the 
Department 0/ the Interior and Related Agencies 0/ the House Comm. on Appropriations, 
lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 501 [hereinafter House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations­
Part 12] (statement of Representative Lindy Boggs of Louisiana). 
340. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 236 (statement of James D. 
Henry, Vice President, ARCO Exploration Co.); Hearing on OCS Leasing 4ctivities, supra 
note 102, at 194-95 (statement of Philip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Of­
ficer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
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ural gas provide for over two-thirds of all the energy used in the 
United States, and all indications suggest that they will continue to be 
the nation's chief energy sources in the foreseeable future. It takes 
many years to discover and produce new OCS oil and gas supplies. 
Leasing moratoria not only delay the search for new hydrocarbon sup­
plies now, but will delay production in the 1990's and beyond, when 
the need for domestic oil and gas is likely to be far more urgent than it 
is today.341 ­
Opponents of leasing moratoria also argue that the United States 
cannot afford the economic costs that moratoria inflict on today's 
economy in terms of lost federal revenues and employment opportuni­
ties. Revenue from the OCS leasing program is the second largest con­
tributor to the federal treasury.342 OCS bonuses, rentals, and royalties 
provided over $87 billion to the federal government in cumulative rev­
enue from 1953 through 1987.343 If the 1984 fiscal year moratoria 
became permanent, it is estimated that approximately 3.5 billion bo­
nus dollars would be lost and net economic value losses would total 
$8.8 billion.344 In today's economy, it is difficult to justify congres­
sionalleasing moratoria that deny the United States revenue from this 
established source of funds. 345 
The benefits of the OCS leasing program extend beyond revenues 
to the federal government and a more secure petroleum supply for the 
nation. Studies analyzing the contribution of OCS activities to the 
United States economy found that in 1981 OCS activities generated 
more than 700,000 jobs, $25 billion in expenditures and nearly 1 % of 
this nation's total economic output. A total ban on OCS leasing off 
California would negatively affect a wide variety of United States in­
dustries and would be felt in virtually all fifty states. Inland states 
which supply a large portion of the industrial goods that support off­
shore petroleum operations would be particularly affected. Five of 
those states-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania­
would lose approximately 35,000 jobs associated with OCS 
341. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 229 (statement of c.B. Wheeler, 
Senior Vice President for Exploration, Exxon Co., U.S.A., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum 
Inst.). 
342. Id. at 17 (statement of Representative Solomon P. Ortiz of Texas). 
343. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 73. 
344. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 8 (statement of Representative 
John Breaux of Louisiana). 
345. Id. at 237 (statement of James D. Henry, Vice President of Finance and Plan­
ning, ARCO Exploration Co.). See also Id. at 17 (statement of Representative Solomon P. 
Ortiz of Texas). 
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activities.346 
The moratoria are also having a negative impact on employment 
opportunities, particularly within the oilfield industry.347 An analysis 
of the effects of the leasing moratoria by the DOl for fiscal year 1984 
reported that in the California OCS region, 2,085 jobs were lost.348 
The relationship between offshore exploration activity and employ­
ment is particularly strong in the Gulf States.349 Offshore activity in 
1984 supported approximately 10,000 jobs in Texas.35o A 1984 study 
prepared by the Texas Department of Water Resources found that one 
new job in the oil and gas industries creates 3.7 new jobs in other 
sectors of the Texas economy.351 
The offshore industry also cites its environmental safety record as 
an additional reason why current leasing moratoria should be lifted. 352 
From 1954 to 1987, a total of 26,791 wells were drilled in the federal 
OCS.353 Despite all of this activity, only one significant oil well blow­
out has occurred, resulting in the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. 354 
Studies have shown that the environmental damage was temporary 
and that the area suffered no long-term adverse environmental. ef­
fects.355 The contribution of OCS exploration and production activi­
ties to total oil spilled in United States waters has been insignificant 
346. House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 
320-21 (statement of Richard L. Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on 
behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst. and the Western Oil and Gas Ass'n). 
347. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 189-90 (statement of 
Philip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on be­
half of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
348. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 38-39 (statement of Representa­
tive Jack Fields of Texas). 
349. ld. at 4; House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 12, supra note 
339, at 500 (statement of Representative Lindy Boggs of Louisiana). 
350. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 4 (statement of Representative 
Jack Fields of Texas). 
351. ld. 
352. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 340 (statement of Atlantic 
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS); House Hearings on 
the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 315-16 (statement of Richard L. 
Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst. 
and the Western Oil & Gas Ass'n); OCS Moratoriums are Reactions to Past Circumstances, 
Not Current Problems, Oil & Gas J., July I, 1985, at 17; Congress Subverts its Own OCS 
Development Mandate by Denying Funds for Lease Sales, supra note 323, at 39. 
353. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 31. 
354. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 180-82 (statement of Max 
G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Exploration, Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petro­
leum Inst.). 
355. ld. at 181. 
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and exaggerated.356 Ironically, by enacting lease moratoria, Congress 
is promoting not only increased dependence on foreign oil, but is en­
couraging the transportation of oil on tankers which are far more dan­
gerous to the marine environment than OCS activities.357 
In addition, opponents of leasing moratoria point out that OCS 
activities do not have an adverse impact on the nation's sport and 
commercial fisheries. 358 Since 1954, over 90% of the oil and gas pro­
duced in the federal OCS has come from the Gulf states of Louisiana 
and Texas. The commercial harvest of fish and shellfish has actually 
increased in the Gulf of Mexico.359 
Finally, the DOl argues that the moratoria imposed by appropri­
ations committees arbitrarily circumvent the objectives of the OC­
SLAA.36O The 1978 amendments clearly provide that a primary 
purpose of the OCS leasing process is the "expedited exploration and 
development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order to achieve na­
tional economic and energy policy goals, assure national security, re­
duce dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance 
of payments in world trade."361 In addition, in compliance with sec­
tion 18 of OCSLAA, the DOl's five-year leasing program is designed 
to develop a balanced approach for sharing the "developmental bene­
fits and environmental risks among the various regions."362 Leasing 
moratoria are inconsistent with both of these objectives. They prohibit 
development of domestic reserves and preclude the balancing man­
dated by the OCSLAA by upsetting the regional distribution of devel­
opment.363 To date, 97% of the wells drilled in the federal OCS are 
located in the Gulf of Mexico. In contrast, oil and gas leasing is pro­
hibited in approximately 85% of the California OCS.364 
356. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 284-86 (statement of James D. 
Henry, Vice President, Arco Exploration Co.). 
357. Id. at 4 (statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas). 
358. [d. at 248, 288-89 (statement of Atlantic Richfield Co.); Hearing on DeS Activi­
ties, supra note 102, at 182 (statement of Max G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Explora­
tion, Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). 
359. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 6 (statement of Representative 
Robert L. Livingston of Louisiana). The increase in the commercial harvest of fish and 
shellfish in the Gulf of Mexico is the result of more effort and of harvesting of new species. 
Id. at 248 (statement of Atlantic Richfield Co.). 
360. Id. at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Carruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Min­
erals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
361. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1982). 
362. Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B). 
363. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car­
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
364. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 191-92 (statement of 
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Congressionally imposed leasing moratoria are in fact bad public 
policy. Any government action that adversely affects the timely devel­
opment of OCS energy resources will have a significant impact on this 
nation's energy security and economy, both today and in the future. 365 
Congressional moratoria in appropriations bills .are an unsound ap­
proach to formulating a national OCS leasing policy. They circum­
vent the detailed consultation procedures prescribed by Congress in 
the OCSLAA for both the development of the five-year program and 
the sale-specific leasing process.366 There are numerous statutes pres­
ently in effect designed to define and promote balanced OCS energy 
development, including the OCSLAA, the Coastal Zone Management 
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. Leasing moratoria 
eliminate this balance by precluding even the possibility of energy ex­
ploration and production in areas with significant oil and gas 
reserves.367 Leasing moratoria cannot be reconciled with these 
statutes. 
It is clearly important that the federal offshore leasing program be 
conducted in an environmentally safe manner. Also, it is important to 
remember that the hydrocarbon resources underlying the federal OCS 
belong to all citizens of the United States. They are not the exclusive 
possessions of the adjoining coastal states, and the development of 
these resources is not a matter that concerns only one state or only one 
group of states. The OCSLAA clearly provides that when vital deci­
sions must be made concerning OCS leasing policy, it is the national 
interest that must prevail. Continued delay in leasing federal offshore 
lands is not in the national interest. The development of OCS energy 
resources is important to the future of United States citizens.368 
IV. EVALUATING SECRETARY WATT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AREAWIDE LEASING 
A major policy consideration of the OCS program is the rate at 
which offshore resources are made available for private develop-
Philip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on be­
half of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n). 
365. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car­
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
366. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 13 (statement of 
Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior). 
367. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 19 (statement of Representative 
Norman D. Shumway of California). 
368. House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 
316,322 (statement of Richard L. Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on 
behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst. and the Western Oil and Gas Ass'n). 
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ment.369 FormerSecretary Watt's decision to increase the oes acre­
age leased annually was based on six goals of the Reagan 
administration: (1) to increase domestic production on the oes and 
lessen the nation's reliance on foreign energy supplies; (2) to expand 
the amount of acreage leased; (3) to inventory the resources of the 
oes; (4) to boost the economy; (5) to create market-oriented condi­
tions for offshore production; and (6) to continue protection of the 
environment.370 
A major goal of Secretary Watt's oes program was to increase 
domestic production and to decrease the nation's dependence on for­
eign oil. 371 The Secretary's program, however, has had little or no 
effect on the domestic production of oes oil and gas and has not less­
ened United States reliance on foreign oil.372 Production of hydrocar­
bon resources from the federal' oes has remained fairly constant, 
rising from 9.3% of domestic oil production in 1981 to only 12.1 % in 
1987. Natural gas production has also remained relatively constant, 
growing slightly from 24% to 26% of the total United States produc­
tion in those respective years. 373 Furthermore, United States depen­
dence on foreign oil has increased from approximately 34% of total 
consumption in 1981 to 42% of total consumption in 1988. Particu­
larly worrisome is the fact that since 1986, approximately 90% of the 
increase in United States oil imports has come from OPEC sources, 
primarily Middle East countries.374 
Two additional key objectives of the Watt program were to ex­
pand the amount of acreage leased and to inventory the nation's oes 
energy resources. 375 The oil industry now holds leases on more than 
26 million acres of the oes, 22.3 million in the Gulf of Mexico 
alone. 376 However, much of this has yet to be drilled.377 Results of 
areawide lease sales held since 1983 indicate that an increased amount 
of acreage has been leased. In 1984, a record 7.5 million acres were 
369. OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 15: 
370. oes Oversight Hearings-Part2, supra note I, at 49-55 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
371. Id. 
372. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 55. 
373. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 85. 
374. Hamilton, u.s. Oil Output Drops to 24-Year Low, Washington Post, Jan. 19, 
1989, at A13, col. 2. 
375. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 55 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
376. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 13. 
377. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 457 (statement of 
Patricia E. Hughes, OCS Coordinator, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office). 
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leased.378 However, much of this increase has been limited to the Gulf 
of Mexico. 379 Starting with the advent of areawide leasing in 1983 
through 1986, leases have been awarded for approximately 18.2 mil­
lion acres in the Gulf of Mexico region.380 In contrast, only 3.6 mil­
lion acres have been leased in the Alaska, Atlantic, and Pacific OCS 
regions.38 I Similarly, from 1954 through 1986, 26,019 wells were 
drilled in the federal OCS.382 The majority of these-24,983-were 
drilled in the Gulf of Mexico. Wells drilled in the Alaska, Atlantic, 
and Pacific regions totaled only 1,036.383 From 1983 through 1986, 
3,733 wells were drilled in the Gulf of Mexico. In contrast, only 191 
wells were drilled in the remaining United States OCS regions.384 It 
appears, therefore, that Secretary Watt's program has encouraged 
more leasing of OCS acreage but has not increased the rate of OCS 
exploration, with the exception of the Gulf of Mexico. 385 
Secretary Watt repeatedly claimed that his program was an inte­
gral part of President Reagan's economic recovery package386 and 
would increase treasury revenues. 387 There is no question that the 
Watt program's increased size and pace of lease offerings resulted in 
more annual revenues to the federal treasury than in past years. 388 
Total bonuses paid for leases for the 1981-86 period were approxi­
mately $22.2 billion. In contrast, bonuses paid for leases from the be­
ginning of the federal OCS program in 1954 through 1980 totalled 
only $30.8 billion.389 There remain, however, serious concerns as to 
whether these figures represent fair market value for the sale of public 
resources.390 
The need to generate revenues in order to reduce the federal 
378. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12. 
379. Vass, A Comparison ofAmerican and British Offshore Oil Development During 
the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations-Part II, 21 TULSA L.J. 225, 296-98 (1985) 
[hereinafter Vass II]. 
380. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 10. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. at 31. 
383. Id. 
384. Id. at 30-31. 
385. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 457 (statement of 
Patricia E. Hughes, OCS Coordinator, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office). 
386. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G. 
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). 
387. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 55. 
388. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 124-25 (statement of Andrew 
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
389. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12. 
390. See supra notes 220-97 and accompanying text. 
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budget deficit was a consideration in developing the accelerated OCS 
leasing schedule.391 The Office of Management and Budget en­
couraged the DOl to pursue an aggressive OCS leasing program as 'an 
important revenue enhancing measure,392 and DOl spokesmen have 
acknowledged the contribution the OCS program makes in raising rev­
enues for the Treasury.393 Richard Delaney, Assistant Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs and Director of the Coastal Zone Management 
Program in Massachusetts, has charged that the main goal ofthe Watt 
OCS leasing plan was, in fact, to collect revenue to offset the federal 
budget deficit. 394 
Although it produced increased revenues, Secretary Watt's pro­
gram did not promote competitive market conditions for OCS produc­
tion. In fact, the opposite occurred. Large acreage offerings and the 
increased sale frequency produced conditions in which an economi­
cally competitive market did not exist.395 
Secretary Watt also failed to take measures ensuring the contin­
ued protection of the environment. As noted previously, at the same 
time the DOl was rapidly accelerating OCS oil and gas leasing, the 
Reagan administration proposed the elimination of federal funding for 
state implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Program, the 
Coastal Energy Impact Program, and the National Sea Grant Pro­
gram. These programs provide federal funding which is used to miti­
gate the adverse impact of coastal energy development. 396 
The apparent guiding philosophy behind Secretary Watt's OCS 
program was to lease as much of the OCS as possible, with little con­
391. Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 2-3; OCS 
Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 316; PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED 
OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 23; Jennrich, u.s. Oilmen Supporting Reagan, 
but Some Fear Broken Promises, Oil & Gas J., Oct. II, 1982, at 57-58. Secretary Watt's 
program was not the first time that the OCS program has been used to generate revenues 
for the federal government. In the 1970's, "the needs of the Bureau of Budget [now the 
OMB] dictated when and where to lease. The Shelf oil and gas-leasing program was heav­
ily influenced by the desire to generate revenues for the [federal] Treasury." COMPTROL­
LER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RED-75-343, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL GOALS TO ACCELERATE LEASING OF OIL &. GAS 
RESOURCES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (1975) [hereinafter OUTLOOK FOR 
ACCELERATING OCS LEASING]. 
392. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 88, at 22. See also Palmer & Kelly, 
Government Praised for Policy Changes, OFFSHORE, June 20, 1983, at 35, 38. 
393. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 96 (statement of J. Robinson 
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior). 
394. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 324 (statement of 
Richard Delaney, Chairman, New England/New York Coastal Zone Task Force). 
395. See supra notes 227-46 and accompanying text. 
396. See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text. 
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cern for the revenue impact of flooding the market with tract offerings 
and with no assurance about when oil and gas would be produced or 
whether state and local governments could effectively plan for acceler­
ated offshore ·development.397 The results of this decision demonstrate 
the effects of operating a leasing program based on such a philosophy. 
Leasing the federal OCS to industry faster than is practicable has 
made it difficult to plan for environmental protection,398 assess the 
value of OCS resources,399 and promote economic competition.400 
This situation has contributed to uncertainty about the value of OCS 
resources, has encouraged private speculation in these resources, and 
has caused industry to allocate scarce capital on lands with little or no 
resource potentia1.401 As a result, Secretary Watt's program resulted 
in less revenue for the Treasury than would have been received if the 
slower pace of the prior tract-selection process had been followed. 402 
Secretary Watt's justification for accelerated leasing was based on 
the flawed assumption that making large amounts of offshore acreage 
available for lease would stimulate increased production of OCS oil 
and gas.403 In fact, the production of hydrocarbon reserves is far more 
dependent upon the prevailing economics of exploration and develop­
ment than on the number of leases distributed.404 Market forces con­
strain the economic viability of development of OCS leases. The 
current world-wide excess of petroleum production capacity, the con­
tinuing depressed demand for petroleum, and the rising costs of devel­
oping a lease into a producing unit limit the development of OCS 
reserves. These conditions make investment in developing new hydro­
carbon reserves a risky venture and are more important factors in in­
dustry decision making than the availability of large numbers of lease 
397. OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 16. 
398. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 150 (statement of Sarah Chasis, 
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.). 
399. Id. at 124-30 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Pub­
lic Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
400. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18-21. 
401. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 124-30 (statement of Andrew 
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); OCS SALE 
35, supra note 223, at 33. 
402. EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, 
at 18. 
403. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WAlT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 55; Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 127 (statement of Andrew 
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
404. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 127-28 (statement of Andrew 
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
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offerings.40s The transfer of large amounts of scarce industry capital 
to the federal government in the form of bonuses paid for leases may 
have diverted needed financing from exploration budgets and may 
have actually caused companies to defer development of OCS 
tracts.406 For example, while the number of producing leases has 
steadily risen during the Reagan administration, the ratio between 
non-producing and producing leases has also risen, indicating that the 
Watt program has been a successful lease acquisition program, but 
that industry has deferred developing the leases it has acquired.407 In 
sum, the Watt leasing policies have been constrained by the price of oil 
because development of OCS gas and oil will proceed no faster than 
market forces will allow. 
Areawide leasing is a workable concept. A concept similar to 
areawide leasing is used in most other countries, including Great Brit­
ain and Norway.408 The major issues in any offshore leasing policy are 
how the government, as owner of public resources, determines which 
areas contain the most promising geologic structures for hydrocarbons 
and are most likely to be of interest to industry, and how it decides 
which areas should be deleted from lease offerings because their 
unique resources could be adversely affected by OCS development ac­
tivities.409 Areawide leasing as implemented by Watt's DOl per­
formed neither of these tasks well. The DOl essentially abdicated 
decisions. on selecting the most promising acreage to industry and 
waited until the last step in the process, the sale, to find out which 
areas were the most promising. The DOl placed the burden of dem­
onstrating that certain areas should be deleted from lease offerings on 
the states and other interested parties. The basic presumption was 
that the entire planning area would be offered in a sale unless the DOl 
was pressured to delete an area.4 \O 
The Watt OCS program was hastily developed and did not ade­
405. Id.; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 409 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Di­
rector, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
406. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 128 (statement of Andrew 
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
407. Id. 
408. Vass II, supra note 379, at 306-08. The rapid development of the North Sea is 
largely attributed to the British policy of offering and licensing vast amounts of OCS acre­
age. British blocks are more than 10 times as large as United States tracts, and Norwegian 
blocks are about 20 times as large. Id. at 306. 
409. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 491 (statement of 
Charles S. Colgan, Director, Policy Div., Maine State Planning Office). 
410. Id. 
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quately address the concerns of coastal states and interested parties. 
The Comptroller General reviewed the Watt program and concluded: 
[R]edesign of the leasing program appears to have been done within 
Interior with little or no input from other Federal agencies and only 
minor consideration of input from the public sector. The riew pro­
gram reflects the Administration's policy decision to accelerate min­
eralleasing more than it reflects the comments received through the 
public participation and review process ....411 
The DOl conducted few studies assessing the potential impact of 
the new OCS program.412 In particular, the DOl did not evaluate the 
program's potential impact with respect to: (1) industry competition 
and small company participation in OCS lease sales; (2) the ability of 
state and local governments to participate in OCS decision making; (3) 
the use and impact of alternative bidding systems; (4) longterm reve­
nues to the federal government; and (5) the impact on the economy.413 
The goals of the Watt program might have been accomplished by 
amending the OCSLAA to broaden the DOl's authority in the leasing 
process. This approach was neither proposed nor considered. Instead, 
Secretary Watt radically altered the OCS program on the basis of the 
discretion that the OCSLAA already delegated to the Secretary. His 
unilateral action, however, was hindered by the lack of a bipartisan 
consensus that an amended OCSLAA would have provided.414 
411. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 28. See also GAO: DeS Leasing Plan is Too Much, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 44­
45. 
Previous attempts by the DOl to accelerate OCS leasing displayed similar planning 
flaws. The Comptroller General characterized DOl's 1974 plan to lease 10 million OCS 
acres as "the most critical policy decision in the 20-year history of Federal Shelf leasing; 
one which deserved careful analysis and considerations." OUTLOOK FOR ACCELERATING 
OCS LEASING, supra note 391, at 4. When the Comptroller General analyzed the 1974 
plan, he found that the proposal was: 
[1] hastily conceived by Interior under pressures exerted by the presence of the 
energy crisis and fears that the newly formed FEA would assume responsibility 
for the Shelf leasing program; 
[2] developed with little input by the operating levels of BLM and [USGS] and 
based on overly optimistic assumptions and inadequate data; 
[3] adopted by Interior policy officials despite opposition from program person­
nel in BLM and [USGS]; and 
[4] developed and adopted without considering environmental impacts, na­
tional-regional supply-and-demand needs, or alternatives to large-scale expansion 
of Shelf leasing. 
Id. 
412. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 
55, at 47. 
413. Id. at 38, 47-48. 
414. Vass I, supra note 35, at 60-6t: 
72 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12: 1 
During the development of his program and during individual 
lease sales held under his supervision, Secretary Watt did only the bare 
minimum required under the OCSLAA to allow for state participa­
tion.415 He did not follow the spirit and intent of the OCSLAA.416 By 
observing only the letter of OCSLAA, Secretary Watt fostered an at­
mosphere of confrontation with the states and other interested parties 
that served only to delay further an already lengthy process of leasing 
OCS lands.417 Secretary Watt's policy of brinksmanship in dealing 
with the coastal states and other interested parties, by refusing to de­
lete environmentally sensitive tracts from lease offerings, forced them 
to initiate litigation to enjoin the sales.418 The policy resulted in leas­
ing moratoria advocated by groups concerned about particular coastal 
areas.419 
A direct consequence of state frustration with the Watt program 
was unprecedented litigation. In the first two years of the Watt pro­
gram, eight of the fifteen scheduled lease sales were challenged on en­
vironmental grounds. In comparison, in the four years prior to the 
adoption of the Watt leasing program, only five lawsuits on environ­
mental grounds were filed against the twenty lease sales scheduled.420 
Secretary Watt's program resulted in major delays from litigation and 
confrontation rather than accelerating the leasing of OCS lands as en­
visioned by the Reagan administration.421 In fact, a more modest pro­
415. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1385 (C.D. Ca. 1981), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Secretary of Interior v. Califor­
nia, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING 
PLAN, supra note 4, at 36. 
416. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. at 1385-86; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY 
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 2. 
417. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 42. Secretary Watt failed to properly interpret the requirements of section 18 of 
the OCSLAA and to involve the states in meaningful participation in the OCS decision 
making process. Id. at 47. A report by the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs stated: "Secretary Watt is not allaying the fears and concerns of groups affected by 
his program. Instead, he has been obstinate and unyielding, and has seemed to encourage a 
fight with his critics." Id. at 47-48. 
418. Id. at 44; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 407 (statement of Andrew Palmer, 
Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). 
419. See supra notes 304-68 and accompanying text. 
420. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 249 (statement of Sarah 
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fense Council, Inc.). DOl policies under the Reagan administration encouraged confronta­
tion with state and local governments and citizen groups. In 1984, there were over 4,000 
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Fine Tune Five-Year OCS Lease Sale Schedule, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 62. 
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gram that focused on the most promising geologic structures in 
planning areas would have produced a more rational and less contro­
versialleasing program. Such a program would have met the national 
needs and would have assured compliance with both the letter and the 
spirit of the OCSLAA. 422 
CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding former Secretary Watt, including 
the OCS program, eventually led to his resignation and the appoint­
ment of President Reagan's close friend William Clark as Secretary of 
the Interior.423 While Secretary Clark increased efforts to consider the 
views of coastal states and interested citizens in OCS issues, there was 
no significant change in the Watt policies. Secretary Clark continued 
to implement an accelerated schedule of OCS lease sales and areawide 
leasing. The administration maintained its opposition to funding fed­
eral programs that would help states plan for the impacts of OCS de­
velopment activities. Thus, the controversy over OCS lease sales 
continued.424 
1984) ("more commonly, states employed litigation as a means for delaying OCS develop­
ment: By increasing risks and raising doubts in potential lessees' minds, the mere threat of 
litigation retarded federal efforts to extend OCS leasing. In sum, continuing federal-state 
conflict arrested expansion of OCS development. ") For example, Arco forfeited a $30 mil­
lion investment by abandoning a leased area considered to be one of the best potentials of 
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